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INTRODUCTION

Working within an organization necessarily entails negotiating
and performing identity. We can most easily illustrate what we mean
by "negotiation" and "performance" with examples. Take a hypothetical organization that values effort and awards promotions to those
who demonstrate it. Assume also that the work is such that individual
effort is difficult to monitor. In response to this difficulty, the employer sets up an incentive scheme-by, for example, offering attractive promotions to those employees who demonstrate that they are
exerting the highest levels of effort-to induce employees to work
with a minimal amount of monitoring. Under these conditions, individual employees seeking promotion have an incentive to engage in
acts that signal to the employer that they are the ones exerting high
amounts of effort.
For example, an employee engaged in casual conversation at the
workplace might mention how tired she is as a result of having had to
work all through the previous two nights. Or an employee might cultivate a harried and tired look to suggest that she is very busy. Or the
employee might leave her jacket in the office and her lights on when
she leaves the office early so as to suggest that she was at work later
than she was. And when she does work late, she might send an email
or phone message to her supervisor before leaving, the subtext of
which might be: "I was working until 1:00 a.m." The list of effortsuggestive actions, or "signaling strategies,"' goes on. The point is
I See Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Close 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2000) (discussing the employment of signaling strategies in the context of consumer transactions).
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that, in contexts in which individual identity characteristics are diffi2
cult to observe, employees have an incentive to work their identities
in ways that suggest to the employer what otherwise might not be
3
readily apparent.
2 Fundamental to this Article is the notion that everyone works identity. But what is
the "identity" that everyone works? Fortunately, the arguments we develop do not require a

rigorous philosophical inquiry into the nature of identity. For a useful discussion of identity formation, see Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics ofInterpretation, 26 NEw.
ENG. L. REV. 1173 (1992). Nevertheless, it may help to draw a distinction between two
conceptions of identity: "sense of self" identity (how we define and perceive ourselves) and
'attributal" identity (how others define and perceive us). We recognize that this dichotomy is artificial because, among other reasons, people define themselves inter-subjectively.
For example, a person's conception of herself as outgoing, creative and witty is necessarily
a function of that person's social interactions with other people. Yet, ultimately, people do
develop particular conceptions of themselves. Of course, that self-image can change.
Thus, who one thinks one is today might not be who one thinks one is tomorrow. Still,
most people form socially stable, though certainly not fixed, impressions of themselves.
This is what is referred to in the Article as a person's "sense of self." Central to the working
identity concept developed in this Article is the notion that, while a person's sense of self
may shift over time, at any given moment he or she is likely to have one.
The question becomes, how does one move from one socially stable impression of
oneself to another? The answer relates, at least in part, to the "attributal" conception of
identity. Assume that Mary has come to think of herself as witty. Once she has developed
this sense of self, her subsequent social interactions-more specifically, how she interprets
them-likely will have one of three consequences: (1) confirm that she is witty, (2) raise
doubts about whether she is witty; or (3) create the impression that she is not witty. To the
extent that Mary is invested in a sense of herself as witty, she is likely to find ways to facilitate other peoples' interpretation of her as being witty. She may adopt specific presentational strategies to signal this characteristic. These strategies may or may not work. If they
are successful, people will respond to Mary in ways that confirm (to Mary) that she is witty.
In other words, they will "attribute" this personal characteristic to Mary. To the extent that
this occurs, Mary will have solidified her sense of self.
Mary, however, may not want her sense of self to comport with her attributal identity.
Even under this scenario, Mary might attempt to control the social meaning of the latter.
To appreciate this point, assume that Mary does not conceive of herself as hardworking.
She fancies herself a "quality of life" person (her sense of self). However, Mary's boss
promotes only those persons who he thinks arehardworking-that is to say, people whose
attributal identity is that they are hardworking. Assume that Mary wants desperately to be
promoted, but that she also wants to maintain her sense of self as a "quality of life" person.
One might say that Mary wants the promotion without doing the work. What might Mary
do? Signal: create the impression that she is doing the work. Of course, Mary's self-impression may, over time, change. Indeed, the more successful she is at signaling, the more her
co-workers and her employer will respond to her in ways that suggest that she is a hard
worker. And the more her colleagues perceive her in this way, the greater the likelihood
that Mary's sense of self-that she is "quality of life" person-will change. This Article
situates these admittedly narrow conceptions of identity in the context of a broader discussion about the relationship between identity performance and workplace discrimination.
3 For a description of this phenomenon in the context of a large, elite law firm, see
David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking Seeding
and Information Control in the InternalLaborMarkets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581,
1594, 1595 & n.53 (1998) (describing the phenomena of overbilling and underbilling in
law firms). On the subject more generally, see Alan Day Haight, PaddedProwess:A Veblenian
Interpretationof the Long Hours of SalariedWorkers, 31J. ECON. Issuzs 29, 35 (1997) ("If the
product of ajob is difficult to identify, then salaried workers will flaunt their hours .... If
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The basic concepts of signaling and identity performance are familiar to most. This Article explores how those incentives and pressures to signal and work one's identity shape the workplace behavior
4
and experiences of outsider groups, such as women and minorities.
We argue that, because members of these groups are often likely to
perceive themselves as subject to negative stereotypes, they are also
likely to feel the need to do significant amounts of "extra" identity
work to counter those stereotypes. Depending on the context, that
extra work may not only result in significant opportunity costs, but
may also entail a high level of risk.
The primary project of this Article is to flesh out the kinds of
work outsiders often feel pressured to do because of negative assumptions about their identities. We argue that both the nature of the work
and the pressure to do it, the "working identity" phenomenon, is a
form of employment discrimination. Heretofore, antidiscrimination
law has not identified, let alone addressed, this problem. Absent from
antidiscrimination law is the notion that outsiders do not passively accept workplace discrimination and stereotyping; that they employ a
variety of strategies to counteract both. These strategies function as
coping mechanisms. We categorize them to illustrate the specific ways
in which they burden outsider employees.
Central to this Article is the claim that, to fully appreciate workplace discrimination, one has to examine and raise questions about
not only the employer's conduct-whether it is legitimate for employers to behave in ways that adversely affect outsider employees-but
the employee's conduct as well-whether it is legitimate for employees to be pressured to behave in particular ways to avoid discrimination. Current antidiscrimination regimes focus almost entirely on the
employer. 5 Lost in this focus are the costs borne by victims who do
identity work to prevent employment discrimination and preempt
stereotyping. Further, to the extent that antidiscrimination law ignores identity work, it will not be able to address "racial conduct" discrimination. Racial conduct discrimination derives, not simply from
the fact that an employee is, for example, phenotypically Asian Amerithe product of a job is clear, measurable, and enviable, then salaried workers will understate their effort .... .").
4 Importantly, the focus on employees is not intended to suggest that the workplace
is the only location for identity performances. On the contrary, identity performances are
reflected in every day social interactions. We situate the analysis in the context of the workplace to illustrate the nexus between identity performance and employment
discrimination.
5 Cf Alan David Freeman, LegitimizingRacialDiscriminationThrough Antidiscrimination
Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme CourtDoctrine, in CRrncAL RACE THxoRr THE KEY WRn-nNGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (critiquing consti-

tutional antidiscrimination law for adopting the "perpetrator" rather than the "victim"
perspective).

20001

WORKTNG IDENTITY

1263

can (i.e., her racial status) but also from how she performs her AsianAmerican identity in the workplace (i.e., her racial conduct).
I
EvERYoNE WoRKs IDENTIr

A.

The Concept

To take the illustration in the first paragraph a step further, suppose that the firm values not only effort, but also more amorphous
qualities such as collegiality, team work, and trust. Assume that each
of these characteristics is hard to observe. Employees seeking success
within this environment have an incentive to adopt strategies to signal
that they are hard working, collegial, team oriented, and trust worthy.
To signal collegiality, the employee might go out drinking with her
colleagues, attend the firm's social events, or participate on sports
teams with others at work.
Of course, the foregoing actions may not be enough or even necessary to demonstrate collegiality. 6 Nor are institutional incentives
necessary for employees to be collegial. The point is that, when employers value attributes that are hard to observe, individual employees
have an incentive to take actions that suggest that they have those
7
attributes.
B.

The Negotiation

The question becomes: What actions will the employee take?
That is, if the employee is interested in signaling to the employer that
he exhibits a certain characteristic, how will he do so? The answer
turns on a negotiation and, more specifically, on how the employee
chooses to negotiate his identity at work. Consider a shy and reserved
employee who enjoys his job. He is happiest when he goes to work and
performs his duties with little or no non-job-related interactions with
his co-workers. Moreover, he does not enjoy, and thus would rather
not attend, official or unofficial after-work social events. He is aware,
however, that his organization values and encourages collegiality. Indeed, he believes that, because many of the people considered for
promotion have the same credentials and overall work product, collegiality is an important criterion for promotion.
6 Actions sufficient to demonstrate collegiality in one institutional setting, like attending faculty meetings, may be insufficient to demonstrate collegiality in another.
7
Cf ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 77 (1959)
("[O]ne finds that service personnel, whether in profession, bureaucracy, business, or
craft, enliven their manner with movements which express proficiency and integrity, but,
whatever this manner conveys about them, often its major purpose is to establish a
favorable definition of their service or product.").
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If the employee is interested in advancement, he will probably
make a decision about how to remain happy at work while maximizing
his opportunities for advancement. He is likely to engage in a negotiation.8 The negotiation is between the employee's sense of selP and
his sense of the institutional values involved (here, collegiality). 1 The
employee may decide that, in the end, he cannot "compromise" his
sense of identity, that he needs to be happy at work, and that engaging in office small talk or attending after-work events interfere with
that happiness. He may not explore other ways of maximizing his opportunities for advancement.
Alternatively, the employee may decide to "compromise" his
sense of identity. That is, he may decide that, while he would rather
not socialize with his colleagues, he should nonetheless do so to im8 Even before arriving at the question of workplace identity, one might say that the
individual is already engaged in a series of negotiations. As others have observed, identity
is formed, or socially constructed, through a series of interpolations (or negotiations). See,
e.g., Homi K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994); JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT
MATTER (1993); BRUCE WLSHIRE, ROLE PLAYING AND IDENTITY (1982); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property,106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1763-64 (1993); see alsoGoFFMAN, supranote 7,
at 15 (observing "that when an individual appears before others he will have many motives
for trying to control the impression they receive of the situation"); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths
of Identity: Individualand Group Portraitsof Race and Sexual Orientation,43 UCLA L. REv. 263,
287 (1995) (citing Goffman for the proposition that "the creation and maintenance of a
person's social identity" is "a process of negotiation between the individual and others").
In other words, a person's identity is a function of her day-to-day interactions with other
people-how she perceives and responds to them, and how they perceive and respond to
her. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality: Considering
Employmen 62 AM. Soc. REv. 218, 219 (1997) ("Interaction requires coordinating your
behavior with that of another. To act yourself, you need some way of making sense of and
anticipating the other's behavior.... [T]his requires that you develop at least a minimal
definition, some initial beginning of 'who' you and the other are in this situation." (citation omitted)). Our admittedly reductionist discussion in the text is intended to reveal
how the structure and norms of a particular institution shape the employee/employer
interpolation.
9 We do not suggest that a person has a true or real identity or essence. Nor do we
argue that at some moment in a person's life, she can really know who she is. See Hutchinson, supranote 2, at 1192 (invoking the postmodern suggestion that "that the traditional
notion of authenticity-'to thine own self be true'-is an immediate patient for postmodern
surgery"). But a person often has a sense of who she is and who she wants to become. A
person might engage in acts of generosity to "become" a more generous person. A person
might develop a practice of socializing with her co-workers to "become" a more social
person. This is not to deny that one's understanding of who they are and who they can
become is constrained by the social context. Cf Joan Williams, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249, 270
(1999) (describing social constraints on women's choices). There are "scripts" (social
norms) that we (think we must) live by. Yet, people make choices about how to perform
these scripts. We argue that those choices can be informed by, among other things, a
desire to fit in or do well in a particular institutional culture.
10 It is possible for the employee to either be wrong about the institution's existing
values or miscalculate the relative importance of the criteria involved in the institution's
values. The key is that the employee's estimation of whether and to what extent an organization values certain characteristics, will among other factors, shape how she performs her
identity in that environment.
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prove his chances of promotion. Whatever the employee decides, he
will take a series of actions to reflect his decision. In this sense, employees are engaged in a continual process of negotiating and performing identity." The choice of how to perform identity is a
negotiation to the extent that it reflects a conflict resolution. 12 The
11 Note, however, that people always are already engaged in a series of performances.
Judith Budler makes this argument with respect to gender, and we do not quarrel with that
general proposition. See Bummt, supra note 8, at 136-39; see alsojudith Butler, Imitation and
GenderInsubordination,in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN TI-oRIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 19 (Diana Fuss
ed., 1991). Still, there is a distinction between a "pure" social constructivist account of
gender as a performance (the notion that gender is a performance to the extent that
gender is socially constructed) and a strategic/social constructivist account of gender as
performance (the notion that gender is a performance to the extent that people make
choices, albeit under constraints, about how to perform their socially constructed genders). See id. at x-xi. Consider the case of two employees, both of whom are socially constructed as men: everyone who observes these two employees would identify them as men.
One might take the position that both are necessarily performing gender because neither
man can escape gender categorization. They can gender bend or even gender cross, but
cannot exist outside of a political and social culture in which gender matters. Neither man
can decide that he does not want to be gendered.
This observation does not imply that we cannot or do not make choices about how we
want to be gendered. Certainly, individuals cannot decide whether they want to bring gender into being. But they do have some choices about how to bring gender into being.
After all, more than one way exists to be gendered. More than one way exists of bringing
gender into being. Our hypothetical employees may not be able to "take off" gender.
However, each has "options" with respect to how to "wear" or give meaning to his gender.
More specifically, both men can take very different actions by engaging in very different performances and still be intelligible as gendered subjects. We are mindful that these
choices are exercised under constraints. That is, we recognize that the disciplinary nature
of our gender norms coerces us into making particular kinds of choices about how to selfrepresent: "Men" wear suits and "women" wear dresses. Yet individuals make these choices.
There is some agency. People do participate in the social construction of their identities.
See Kathryn Abrams, Afterward: CriticalStrategy and theJudicialEvasion of Difference, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1426, 1428 (2000) (explaining that "the subjects of inequality are not simply
acted upon, but manifest a partial agency").
This observation holds true for employees in the workplace. Our argument is that
workplace norms or criteria create incentives for employees to socially construct or perform their identities to comport with those norms or criteria. To be sure, the actions that
employees take-the strategic performances in which they engage-to shape how employers interpret their workplace identity do not constitute the whole or even the most important story about identity construction and performance at work. We argue, however, that
strategic identity performances remain an important and under-theorized part of the story.
For a less stylized account of the relationship between institutional norms and strategic
behavior, see generally PrEP. BouRDmEU, LANGUAGE Am SYMBOUC POWER (1991) (presenting a more ineffable sense of the indefinable in considering how people "fit" into an environment, how well they believe they do so, and how they believe others perceive them to fit
in).
12 A tension or a conflict will not always exist. The employees' sense of identity may
on occasion comport with workplace norms. A recent article in the HarvardBusiness Review, however, suggests that these conflicts are both significant and commonplace. The
article, by Herminia Ibarra, discusses the need for junior associates at professional service
firms, such as investment banks or management consultancies, who are aspiring for promotion to think carefully about constructing "partner" identities. See Herminia barra,
Making PartnerA Mentor's Guide to the PsychologicalJourney,78 HARv. Bus. REv. 147 (2000).
As barra points out, the process of forging a new identity is not only complex and difficult,
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employee seeking advancement has an incentive to resolve the conflict between his sense of his identity and his sense of the identity he
needs to project to signal to his employer that he exhibits the characteristics the employer values. Figure 1 describes this negotiation
process.
Point one in Figure 1 represents the employee's sense of self.
This sense of self allows the employee to distinguish between two
kinds of personal conduct: identity-affirming conduct that comports
with his sense of identity, and identity-negating conduct that runs
afoul of the employee's sense of self. This identity-affirming/identitynegating dichotomy is reflected in common expressions, such as "I
sold out," "I compromised my beliefs," and "It was so unlike me to do
X."13

At point two, the employee forms an impression about the criteria that the institution values: in this case, collegiality, which is measured in part by after-work social interaction. At point three, the
employee realizes that a conflict exists between his antisocial identity
and the criteria that the institution values, sociability. At point four,
the employee engages in a negotiation of points one and two. At
point five, the employee decides whether and how he wants to resolve
the conflict. He may decide, like Sammy Davis, Jr., that "I've gotta to
be me.' 4 Or, like Polonius in Hamlet,his existential mantra might be:
"[T]o thine own self be true.' u 5 In this case, the employee's performance will reflect this negotiation-he will not engage in after-work socializing. On the other hand, the employee may decide to
compromise and socialize after work. This resolution will cause the
employee to engage in some after-work socializing. The extent of the
employee's performance of socializing will depend on the degree to
which he is willing or feels the need to compromise his identity.

but also painful because associates often feel that they are compromising their "true"
selves. See id. at 152-53.
13
One could argue that being is doing or doing is being. Put another way, we are
what we do. Our actions are both formative and reflective of identity. We do not quarrel
with this. Our argument is about self-perception and self-definition, although expressions
like "That's so unlike Susan!" suggest that people form idealized impressions of others as
well.
14 Sammy Davis Jr., I've Gotta Be Me on I've Gotta Be Me: The Best of Sammy Davis Jr.
(Reprise Archives 1996).
15 WruAm SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAML=T,PRINCE OF DENmARK act 1, sc. 3,

L78 (Susanne L. Wofford ed., Bedford Books 1994). The everyday cultural meaning of this
quote from Hamlet is at odds with the meaning that the quote has in the play. In the play,
Polonius recites the line to his son Laertes. Shakespeare portrays Polonius as an old fool,

whom Hamlet kills by mistake. Neither Polonius nor his words are taken seriously in the
play.
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1

PERFORMANCE/NEGOTIATION DYNAMIC
(1)
Employee's Sense of Self
(asocial, noncollegial)

v.

(2)
Workplace Criteria
(social, collegial, after-work
employee interaction)

(3)
Conflict

I
I

Negotiation
(between (1) and (2))

(5)

Compromise Identity/Resolve Conflict?

Yes

-

No

Performance

Some Socializing

-

No Socializing

II
OuTsmEs WORKING IDENTrIY
A.

Stereotypes at Work

Part I examined what it means to say that employees work their
identities through a series of negotiations. Part II turns to how this
general phenomenon is reflected in and reproduced by the workplace
experiences of a specific category of employees: members of an outsider group. 16 Imagine a workplace that values effort, collegiality,
16 For purposes of this Article, insiders are heterosexual white males. A person's status as insider or outsider, of course, is both relative and context dependent. For example,
one of us has written about the outsider status of black gays and lesbians in both the mainstream black-civil-rights and gay-rights discourses. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay
Rights, Civil Rights: "ComparativeRacialization" and "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, "47 UCLA L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoringthe Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theoiy and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1999)
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team work, leadership abilities, and trust-for example, a large, elite
corporate law firm. 17 Informally, the firm has two tracks for its new
employees,' 8 most of whom it hires straight out of law school or from
judicial clerkships. One track is for the employees whom the firm
plans to groom for partnership. 19 For this track, the firm wants employees with interpersonal skills, leadership ability, the capacity to inspire trust, and a strong work ethic. The other track is for associates
whom the firm expects to employ for between two and six years to
work on teams led by partners and by those associates being groomed
for partnership. For this second track, which involves much
"paperwork," the firm wants employees who will work hard, follow or20
ders, and pay attention to detail.
Assume also that the insider group at this elite law firm consists of
heterosexual, white males. 21 The outsiders, therefore, include women, racial minorities, gays, and lesbians. Posit that insiders have certain stereotypes about members of outsider groups. 22 Thus, absent
additional information about the individual, a male Korean American
who recently graduated from Harvard Law School might be stereo(describing similar marginalization in critical race theory). By the same token, there exist
contexts in which heterosexual white men are outsiders. Take, for example, Howard University. That said, the outsider status of the heterosexual white student at Howard is likely
to be quite different from that of a black student at a predominantly white university. Cf
Carbado, supra note 1 (discussing the "normalization" of white male heterosexual
identity).
The more complex point is that many individuals do not fall easily into either the
insider or outsider boxes, but traverse the space in between. See Alice G. Abreu, Lessons
From LatCrit:Insiders and Outsiders,All at the Same Time, 53 U. MAMNi L. REV. 787, 788 (1999)
(making the point that many people are likely to have both insider and outsider aspects of
their identity that co-exist). Having both outsider and insider aspects to one's identity,
however, does not alter the point that an incentive exists to do work to counter negative
stereotypes that might apply to the outsider aspects of that identity.
17 See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, supranote 3, at 1609 (describing, within the elite-law firm
context, the importance of acquiring "relational capital" and demonstrating that one is a
team player).
18 See id. at 1644-50 (describing the informal multitrack system that exist at many elite
law firms).
19
Cf GosiAN, supranote 7, at 124 ("Employers complete the harmony [of the workplace] by hiring persons with undesirable visual attributes for back region work, placing
persons who 'make a good impression' in the front regions.").
20 Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 3, 1609-1613.
21
To a large extent, our conceptualization of the insider is static-indeed, essentialistic. We engage in this essentialism to focus on the behavior of outsiders. In a different
paper, we focus attention on insiders and address the extent to which insiders can engage
in signaling strategies to diminish the workplace burden stereotypes place on outsiders. See
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OREGON L. REv. (forthcoming

2000).
22 See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prudice:HelpingLegal DecisionmakersBreak the
Prjudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. Rxv. 733 (1995); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STm'. L. REv. 1161, 1186-1217 (1995) (discussing psychological studies that show that discrimination against stereotyped groups is ubiquitous).
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typed as being good at math and science, unassertive, quiet, hardworking, uncreative, and impersonal.2 3 To get onto the partnership track
at the firm, an employee must be perceived to have leadership abilities, personality, the ability to induce trust in others, and a good work
ethic. Like the other employees, the Korean-American employee has
an incentive to create the impression that he possesses all the requisite
qualities for the partnership track. However, because of the existence
of stereotypes, the Korean-American employee and the insider employee are differently situated, or have a different workplace standing,
with respect to the institutional criteria that the firm values and the
actions that they (think they) will need to take to demonstrate to the
employer that they have the potential to be successful partners. In
other words, while all the employees in our hypothetical law firm have
an incentive to demonstrate that they have the potential to become
partners, the burden of proof, and thus the precise nature of the incentive, varies across identities.
Recall the assumption that Korean-American Harvard Law School
graduates are generally perceived as quiet, unassertive, good at math
and science (detail-oriented work), and lacking in creativity and personality. Those assumptions work well for an employee on the nonpartnership track. But they conflict with the qualities that the firm
requires in the employees it plans to groom for partnership. The
stronger this conflict, the harder the employee will have to work to
overcome the negative assumptions by employing stereotype-negating
24
strategies.
In the context of this Article, positive and negative stereotypes are
employed to describe the relationship among stereotypes, institutional criteria, and workplace standing. A negative relationship between a stereotype about an employee's identity and a certain
23 These stereotypes tend to coalesce into a "model minority" myth about Asian Americans. See, e.g., Vijay Prashad, Anti D'Souza: The Ends of Racism and the Asian American, 24
AsmasAJ. 23, 32-34 (1998) (book review) (describing the contrasting stereotypes of Asian
Americans and African Americans). Asian Americans are labeled "hard working and familial," while African Americans are stereotyped as lazy and irresponsible, stereotypes used by
writers such as Dinesh D'Souza and Francis Fukuyama. See id.; see also Pat K. Chew, Asian
Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARv L. REv. 1, 24-45
(1994) (describing the pervasive but fallacious stereotype of Asians as the "model minority"); Frank H. Wu, NeitherBlack nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 243-45 (1995) (describing the "reversal" of "the model minority
myth" as creating negative, rather than affirmative, action). For an excellent account of
the specific ways in which Asian Americans have been constructed in law and social policy,
see ROBERT S. CHANG, DIsoRIENTED: AsIAN AMERICANS AND THE NATION STATE (1999).
24 Again, the conflict is between the criteria that the firm values and the stereotypes

that the firm insiders hold about Korean-American employees. The employee might attempt to resolve this conflict by either changing the institutional norms or negating the
stereotype. The employee almost always will be in a better position to do the latter rather
than the former.

1270

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1259

institutional criterion diminishes that employee's workplace standing
and advancement opportunities within that institution. A positive relationship increases workplace standing and advancement
25
opportunities.
While the focus of this Article is the implications of negative stereotypes, depending on the stereotype and the nature of the workplace norms, an outsider employee may be able to exploit a positive
stereotype about her identity. For example, take the assumption of
strong stereotypes of Korean-American Harvard Law graduates as
hard workers. Given this pre-understanding, it might be pointless and
inefficient for such an employee to engage in workplace strategies
that signal to her employer what it (thinks) it already knows-that she
is a hard worker. Further, if the employee is not interested in becoming a partner, but wants to work at the law firm for a few years to pay
off her debts, the stereotypes of hard working, lacking in creativity,
and detail-oriented can help her to both get hired and avoid the part26
nership track.
Admittedly, the definitions of positive and negative stereotypes
that we employ are narrow. They are linked to the question of
whether particular identity-based stereotypes set against specific institutional norms advantage or disadvantage individual employees. The
narrow definitions are used because they help illustrate the point that
employees not only work at their work, but also work at performing
their identities. How hard they work at the latter task turns on
whether a positive or negative relationship exists between a stereotype
about their identity and workplace criteria, and on the strength of
that relationship. When the environment renders observation of an
employee's true characteristics difficult, and employees are competing
for promotion to a fixed number of partnership-track slots, the
stronger the negative or positive stereotypes are, the more or less an
employee is likely to have to work to construct her identity so as to fit
the firm's mold and be put on the partnership track.
B.

The Incentive System: The General Idea

As the preceding discussion indicates, behavior and stereotypes
are not independent. When the stereotype is strong, and the conditions are such that ordinary behavior is not likely to dissipate it, an
outsider subject to a strong negative stereotype has an incentive to
25 Stereotypes, both positive and negative, will differ depending on the outsider
group and the insiders' familiarity with that group.
26 An employee might rationally prefer the paperwork track to the partnership track.
For example, if being on the partnership track involves a significant amount of socializing
with partners and clients, which the employee finds unpleasant, she may prefer to remain
in the background and do paperwork for a few years.
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take actions to negate it. On the other hand, someone subject to
strong positive stereotypes need not work as hard to achieve the same
final evaluation as someone who is subject to negative stereotypes.
Further, the stronger the stereotype, the greater the effect is likely to
be on the employee's behavior. 27 This dynamic-the dialectical relationship between workplace criteria and stereotypes about the employee's identity-creates the workplace incentive system.
Figure 2 illustrates how the incentive system works. Point 1 reflects the employee's interest in advancement. The employee might
(a) be indifferent to advancement, (b) be interested in advancement,
or (c) have no interest at all in advancement. Other things being
equal, the stronger the employee's interest in advancement, the
stronger the incentives to perform her identity to comport with the
criteria that the institution values. Point 2 captures two possible relationships that might exist between the workplace criteria and the stereotypes about the employee's identity. The stereotypes and the
workplace criteria might be (or the employee might perceive them to
be) positively related.
Point 2(a)-the workplace-criteria/identity-stereotype convergence-reflects this relationship. Here, the employee's assumption is
that the employer's stereotypes about her comport with the criteria
that the employer values. As point 2(b) indicates, however, the work27 This proposition assumes that the employee estimates that the benefits of overcoming the stereotype are greater than the costs of overcoming it.
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place criteria and the stereotype could diverge. Here, the stereotype
and the workplace criteria are (or the employee might perceive them
to be) negatively correlated. When this is the case, the employee's assumption is that the employer's stereotypes about her are antithetical
to the criteria that the employer values. Points 2 (a) and 2 (b) illustrate
that the more difficult the workplace criteria are to observe, 28 and the
more negative the relationship is between the workplace criteria and
stereotypes about the employee, the stronger the incentives are for
the employee to signal-through performance-that she possesses
the criteria that the institution values.
C.

The Incentive System in Institutional Context: Law Firms and
Law Faculties

This section places the prior discussion within a specific institutional context: a stylized model of law firms and law faculties. Outsiders enter these institutions with some understanding of their
structure, function, organization, and culture. Further, insiders
within these institutions have various pre-understandings, or stereotypes, of outsiders. The outsiders are aware of the fact that social stereotypes of their identities are a part of their workplace culture. They
know that their employers will likely examine their workplace performances and interactions through stereotypical prisms. The outsiders likely believe that, in the absence of other information, firms and
law faculties will adopt certain default positions with respect to the
outsider's professional standing within the institution. In the context
of a law school faculty, for example, one default position might be
that a female Asian-American feminist professor candidate will not be
an effective teacher, either because of stereotypes of Asian-American
women as lacking authority and being quiet and submissive, or because of stereotypes about feminists as not teaching law and rather
focusing too much on politics and social policy.
The incentive system described suggests that institutional characteristics and group-specific stereotypes influence the kinds of choices
one makes in negotiating identity. This section examines this dynamic in the context of large law firms and law faculties. The basic
characteristics of both sets of institutions are similar enough that they
28

The degree to which one can manipulate one's identity is a function of how accu-

rately the employer can evaluate employees. In a world of perfect information, the employer knows exactly which employees are, for example, hardworking and collegial. To the
extent that employee-specific information is difficult and expensive to collect, the employer will use shortcuts or proxies to determine desirable characteristics. For example,
the employer may interpret the fact that an employee shows up early to work and leaves
late as a sign the she is hard working. When employees learn that the employer is using this
rule of thumb, they will have an incentive to show up early and leave late.
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can be reduced to a simple, albeit stylized, model.2 9 This model serves
as a point of departure to identify the kinds of performative strategies
employees within these, and a host of other similarly structured, institutions might make.
1.

The Up-or-Out Structure: The "Carrot"and the "Stick"

Both law firms and law faculties tend to have up-or-out structures.
Novice employees go through a lengthy trial period, between four and
ten years, at the end of which senior employees decide whether to
promote junior employees to permanent employment. The peculiar
feature of this structure is that a person who is denied a promotion
typically is not allowed to stay in her prepromotion status. The denial
of a promotion also results in the employee being fired; hence, the
30
term "up or out."
The existence of an up-or-out structure suggests room for identity
negotiation in these institutions. An up-or-out structure is an incentive mechanism. The "up" is the carrot and the "out," the stick. In
combination, the carrot and the stick induce employees to exert high
amounts of effort without the employer having to constantly supervise
the employees. The fact that institutions adopt this structure suggests
that exerting day-to-day control over employees' actions is too expensive or counterproductive for the employer. Instead, setting up an
incentive structure that puts the onus on the employees to determine
whether they deserve promotion is more efficient. If they fail, they are
fired or, at least, are not promoted. The structure, therefore, is explicitly meant to give employees room to demonstrate their worthiness, suggesting that room exists to negotiate identity.
The specific nature of the up-or-out structure suggests the kind of
identity an employee would want to negotiate. The reward-the
"up"-is promotion to what is typically permanent employment with a
large salary, although, as of late, partnership at law firms no longer
resembles academic tenure. Given that promotion is to a position of
near permanent employment at a high salary, what are the criteria for
promotion likely to be?

29

The discussion that follows in the next two sections, see Part II.C.1-2, is drawn from

Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 3.

30 Although the structural dynamic that we describe in the text serves as a useful starting point for understanding law firms and law faculties and, more importantly, suffices for
purposes of the arguments that we are making, it is by no means meant to be an accurate
or full description of law firm or law school dynamics. For a discussion of problems with
the stylized model, see id. at 1674-81.
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Tournament Theory: Employees' Eyes on the Prize

In the basic tournament models that economists first used to understand these up-or-out structures, promotion was thought to be a
reward for hard work as an apprentice. In other words, the structure
was thought to be aimed to encourage apprentices to exert high levels
of effort. However, the reality is that the apprenticeship period often
tends to be relatively short compared to the number of years of permanent employment that follow. Therefore, although there is undoubtedly a reward or "prize" element to the promotion decision, the
primary element in the promotion decision must be predictive.
Granting someone a large salary and job security for practically a lifetime as a reward for a relatively short apprenticeship period does not
make sense, especially when the organization needs those who are
promoted to continue to work hard. Promotion, therefore, is likely to
be based on a future prediction about an employee's continued productivity in spite ofjob security. The apprenticeship period gives the
senior members of the organization an opportunity to collect information about the apprentice on which to base the predictive decision.
Promotion, however, is unlikely to be a function of future productivity alone. In both law firms and law faculties, the decision to
promote is typically determined by a vote of the senior members. Future productivity is a criterion, because hiring the most productive
employees enhances the quality of the institution in which the senior
members are invested. But, senior members also have personal agendas that are not necessarily in synch with maximizing institutional productivity. For example, senior employees are typically also concerned
with their own security and advancement, and will, therefore, want to
hire juniors who further these agendas. Thus, a senior law faculty
member might endorse junior faculty engaged in the type of work
that enhances the value of the senior faculty members' work (for example, someone who does work that is derivative and cites the senior
members' work). Or senior members worried about young turks who
might try to take over the institution and alter the cushy status quo
might vote for less threatening and less intellectually capable candidates; for example, a candidate who wants to abolish tenure is unlikely
to garner a lot of support.
Similarly, senior partners in law firms are likely to support candidates who will ensure and enhance their status. Partners will promote
candidates who improve both the firm's bottom line and partners' individual bottom lines. Senior members whose most productive years
are over are unlikely to want a new partner who will lobby for the
senior members to be either fired or forced into early retirement because of the senior members' diminished productivity. As a result,
junior employees have to demonstrate future productivity in terms of
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the institution's bottom line, whether it be in terms of dollars or academic articles, and convince enough seniors that their (the junior's)
promotions will also serve their (the senior's) interests. This self-promotion involves persuading senior members not just of their intellectual capabilities and ability to produce high-quality work, but also of
their commitment to continued hard work, even after becoming partner or obtaining tenure. In other words, junior employees must
demonstrate that they have internalized a norm of hard work. And
they must persuade senior members that they will act in ways that are
consistent with the individual interests of their senior colleagues.
We have noted four factors thus far: intellectual ability, production skills, likelihood of continued productivity despite job security,
and the trust of senior members. Two of those factors, the likelihood
of continued productivity and the trust of senior members, are explicitly related to comfort. First, take continued productivity in the face
of job security. The senior members have to feel confident that the
junior employee has internalized the social norms of the institution.
Given that tenure or partnership implies job security, the senior members must be confident that the junior employee will continue to be
induced or, to use the patois of investment bankers, "incentivized" to
work hard through other pressures, like peer social pressures: guilt,
shame, and the desire for status within the institution.
The employee has to show that he cares about obtaining these
things. During the apprenticeship period, the employee must demonstrate intellectual ability ("candlepower") and skills. Moreover, the
employee must convince senior employees that he has internalized
the social norms of the institution by showing that he values the existing structure and will respect the social hierarchy. 3 ' In colloquial
terms, the junior employee must indicate that he is a collegial, trustworthy team player. These preconditions enable informal social sanctions to work effectively within a group. The junior employee must
credibly show that he will not object to institutional practices very
often. Some dissent is likely to be valued, but not to a level that will
undermine the institutional structure.
Most people commonly believe that a law firm's or a law school's
productivity is measured in terms of hours billed and clients acquired
in the law firm context and in terms of scholarship and teaching in
the law school context. But both institutions are also likely to have a
number of other tasks that are even more difficult to measure and
reward: willingness to handle administrative tasks, enthusiastic participation in committee work, and recruiting. Each of the foregoing tasks
3'

Cf Milton C. Regan,Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties,and the Values ofProfessional-

ism, 13 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmics 1, 54-55 (1999) (explaining why it is crucial for law firms to
cultivate internal cultures of trust and cooperation).
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are necessary for the organization to function effectively, but difficult
to measure and reward. These tasks typically are taken on by "good
citizens." Firms and law faculties, therefore, will want to promote
those who will be highly productive, will not threaten the status quo,
and also those who will be good citizens. The good citizens are those
who will sacrifice for the good of the institution.
D.

The Incentive System and Workplace Discrimination: What's
Performance Got to Do with It?

What does the discussion so far have to do with employment discrimination? As a threshold matter, progress on the civil rights front
over the past few decades has opened a large number of doors for
minority and women employees. 3 2 That progress, while dissipating
certain strong forms of discrimination against out-group, has not eliminated stereotypes. 3 3 When doors to the workplace are open (or at
least not formally closed), but stereotypes still persist, one must ask
how these stereotypes influence the behavior of those who have been
allowed through the door.3 4 We offer three reasons for why it is important to pursue this question. Each of these reasons helps to explain the relationship between identity performance and workplace
discrimination.
First, if we are right in arguing that the difficulty of evaluating
certain individual characteristics and workplace criteria creates incentives for employees to project a workplace identity that comports with
these characteristics and criteria, then it follows that outsiders subject
to negative stereotypes have greater than normal incentives to put effort and thought into constructing that workplace identity.35 On the
32 See Manning Marable, Staying on the Path to RacialEquality, in T
AFFiRMAnvE AcTiON DaiATE 3, 11 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (asserting that affirmative action has

"opened many professional and managerial positions to blacks, Latinos, and women for
the first time"). But seeJody David Armour, Hype and Reality in Affirmative Action, 68 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1173, 1176-1180 (1997) (arguing that many commentators overstate civil
rights progress and citing numerous studies that indicate that blacks still face discrimination in housing, law enforcement, and employment).
3
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race 113 HAuv. L. Rnv. 1130 (2000) (citing materials on
the continuing presence of stereotypes and arguing that, when new forms of interactions
emerge, like in cyberspace, the dynamics of behavior and stereotype generation can
change as well).
34
Cf David Chamy & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficienck-Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination:
A Theory ofEmployment DiscriminationLawfor "High-Level"Jobs,33 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 57,
91 (1998) (arguing that a minority's perception skews that minority's strategies for negotiating the workplace); David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1924,
1964-69 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN
AMEruCA (1999)) (discussing the strategy choices of Larry Mungin, a black Harvard-educated lawyer turned down for partnership at a Chicago-based elite law firm).
35
For discussions of whether outsiders who work to conform to insider expectations
of proper behavior by mimicking the dominant group's behavior are likely to fare better in
the workplace, see Kevin Lang, A Language Theory of Discrimination, 101 Q-J. ECON. 363
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flip side, outsiders subject to positive stereotypes have to put less effort
into image construction. The language of bargaining power helps to
illustrate this point. Other things being equal, an employee would
rather not "compromise" her sense of identity or engage in extra signaling and performative work.3 6 Her bargaining power to avoid this
compromise or extra work is a function of extant negative stereotypes
about her identity. The stronger these stereotypes, the weaker her
bargaining power. The weaker her bargaining power, the more she
37
may have to compromise her identity and engage in the extra work.
Second, in addition to opportunity costs, psychic and risk costs
exist. Psychic costs arise from self-negating and self-denying strategic

behavior.3 8 Consider the care taken by a lesbian employee who, for
strategic reasons such as concerns about workplace harassment or discrimination, decides to remain in the closet. She may even perform a

straight identity by, for example, prominently displaying a photograph
of a male friend on her desk and describing her relationship with him
in ways that suggest heterosexual intimacy. Even heterosexuals en-

gage in strategic performances of their heterosexuality to avoid the
suspicion of homosexuality.3 9 Her decision to remain closeted or to
perform a heterosexual identity may for her be functionally self-negating and self-denying; it sends a message to her employer that she is not

a lesbian.
Strategic behavior is also risky and can backfire. Consider an
Asian-American male assistant professor who wants to project a collegial image. Assume that the institution in question is one in which
(1986) and Amy L. Wax, Discriminationas Acciden4 74 IND. LJ. 1129, 1199-1206 (1999). As
Wax points out in her article, some evidence exists that inadvertent bias is less likely under
counterstereotypic conditions. SeeWax, supra, at 1200 n.205 (citing Charles Stangor et al.,
An InhibitedModel of Stereotype Inhibition, in 11 AnVANCEs IN SOCIAL COGNITION: STEREoTYPE
ACrIVATION AND INHIBrrON 193, 202-03 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1998)).
36
Cf Gor-sN, supra note 7, at 44 (observing that some identity performances will
involve "long, tedious hours of lonely labor that will be hidden"); Angela P. Harris, On
Doingthe Right Thing: Education Work in the Academy, 15 VT. L. Rxv. 125 (1990) (observing
that the "work of promoting empathy toward minorities is not strictly legal work" or "necessarily always public work," but that a "good deal of it occurs in private, interpersonal
relationships").
37 Think of a number line that measures work ethic. There are positive and negative
values, and zero. Every employee who enters the firm has a value. In other words, based
on stereotypes and without any contact with any of the new employees, members of the
firm will make judgments about whether particular employees are, or are likely to be,
hardworking. Firm members might be neutral with respect to some employees, who are
assigned a value of zero. Others may receive a positive value. We think it is highly plausible
that black employees will (think they will) be assigned a negative value. In another article,
we explore how an employee's bargaining power, which again is weakened by stereotypes,
affects the kind of work the employee ends up doing. See Carbado & Gulati, supranote 21.
38
Again, we are not advancing an ontological claim about "true" or "authentic" identities. Rather, the point is that people have a sense of whether they are being true to
themselves. See SHAKEsPEARE, supra note 15, act 1, sc. 3, 1.78.
39
See Carbado, supra note 1.
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faculty meetings tend to be sites of tension and unpleasant political
discussions, such as a discussion on affirmative action or diversity. Assume also that the institution values collegiality and views the tensions
that arise over racial issues as disturbing collegiality. If the AsianAmerican faculty member disagrees with his colleagues about a particular controversial issue, he risks being viewed as uncollegial. Given
these conditions, the Asian-American male faculty member might attempt to demonstrate his collegiality by refraining from disagreeing
with his colleagues, which may or may not be enough to demonstrate
collegiality. If no other stereotypes about Asian-American men existed, the nonintervention/nonparticipation strategy might improve
the Asian-American male's overall "faculty standing." But instead,
given the multiplicity of stereotypes about Asian-American men, this
stereotype-repudiating strategy could end up confirming stereotypes
about Asian-American men being docile, timid, and lacking in polit40
ical and intellectual courage.
These arguments are developed in the next section. First, a caveat. In modeling identity performance as a function of conscious
strategic choices, we do not mean to suggest that all identity-related
decisions are a product of conscious strategizing. Just as a significant
amount of the stereotyping that occurs tends to operate at a subconscious or unconscious level, we expect that a significant portion of the
outsider responses to these stereotypes also operates at the subconscious or unconscious level. 4 1 The conscious-behavior model is a simplifying mechanism to understand what is undoubtedly a more
4
complex phenomenon. 2
40 Further, to the extent that members of other outsider groups on the faculty view
the position of Asian Americans on issues of race and diversity with suspicion, this faculty
member faces the risk of being perceived as a "sell out" by faculty members belonging to

other outsider groups if he fails to make his views in favor of increased racial diversity
known.
41
Unconscious stereotypes and their relevance to discrimination law have been the
topic of considerable recent debate. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Michael
Selmi, Response to ProfessorWax: Discriminationas Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J.
1233 (1999); Wax, supra note 35; Ian F. Haney L6pez, InstitutionalRacisim:JudicialConduct
and a New Theory of RacialDiscrimination, 109 YALE Lj. 1717 (2000).
42 The story that we tell about the incentives that outsiders have to work their identities to negate stereotypes and persuade employers that they will fit into the workplace
culture implicates an argument that Richard Epstein has made for abolishing Title VII.
Epstein's argument is premised on the idea that workplace norms matter and that the
effective operation of these norms is more likely when the workforce shares a common
culture. See PicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRoUNDs: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCPJMINArION LAWs 61-67 (1992); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, CorporateDecisionmaking
and the Moral Rights of Emplyees: ParticipatoryManagement and NaturalLaw, 43 Vn.L. L. REv.
741,798-800 (1998); Finis Welch, Labor-MarketDiscrimination:An InterpretationofIncome Differences in the Rural South, 75 J. POL. ECON. 225, 230-31, 238-40 (1967). Having a racially
homogeneous workforce is an easy and cheap way to produce a workforce with a common

culture. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 61-67. Epstein argues that Title VII's restriction on race-
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III
DOING IDENTr[Y WORK

A.

Performing Identity Is Work

Performing identity consumes resources in the form of time and
effort, 43 which is one of the costs of discrimination. The stronger the
prejudices and the harder it is to observe true characteristics, the
harder an outsider will have to work on managing his identity.44 This
section employs two examples to convey the idea that identity is work,
one from each of the institutional contexts described. First, we focus
on the law school faculty. We provide an indication of the kind of
identity work in which an outsider law professor might engage to repudiate or negate stereotypes about his identity. The second example
is situated in the law firm. Here, we show how the pervasiveness of a
colorblind institutional norm might shape how an outsider attorney
interacts with and performs his identity for insider associates. To the
extent that an institution expects its workplace culture to be colorblind, people of color bear the brunt of the burden of maintaining
this colorblindness. The reason is that the question of whether the
workplace is colorblind will turn primarily on the racial associations
that people of color (per)form at work, assuming few, if any, acts of
intentional race discrimination will occur.
1. Black and Male on the Faculty
45
Consider the case of a hypothetical black male law professor.
The possibility exists that stereotypes about his identity will be at odds

based hiring, therefore, causes inefficiencies by making it much more expensive for an
employer to create a workforce with a common culture. See id. at 76-78. The argument is
flawed, however, in that it is not the employer, but rather the outsider employees who will
incur the cost of acquiring the requisite amounts of cultural capital so as to fit in. See id. at
62-63; see also Drudlla Cornell &William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CoRNE.L L. Rxv. 595, 602,
620, 628, 645 (1999) (demonstrating that the costs of cultural differences inevitably fall on
members of minority groups). Assuming a scarcity ofjobs, the employer will then be able
to choose those outsider employees who demonstrate that they will fit into the workplace
culture. Title VII, for the most part, does not restrict an employer's ability to define its
workplace culture. At the very least, the phenomenon of outsiders working their identity
in ways that this Article suggests ameliorates Epstein's concerns about Title VII.
43 Performing identity can even involve direct expenditures of cash. For example,
imagine a black man who walks into a fancy clothing store in a hurry because he has a
meeting to attend soon. None of the salespeople pay him any attention. In order to get
the salespeople's attention, he might be forced to purchase one of the expensive wallets in
the display case. Once he attracts the attention of the salespeople with his purchase of the
expensive wallet, he is able to get them to help him with the purchase of the suit that he
came to purchase.
44

See GoFntAN, supra note 7, at 44.

45 See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the Academy: Of Poets and
Kings, 68 Cni.-KNT L. REv. 331 (1992) (discussing the issues that faculty of color can face
on predominantly white law faculties).
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with stated or unstated criteria that (he thinks) the institution values. 4 6 The Figure below attempts to capture the negative relationship
that might exist within a particular law school context between the
stereotypes about the professor's identity, and the professional and
social norms of the faculty.
FIGURE

3

Institutional
Values/Employer
Expectations

Social Stereotype:
Black Male Faculty
Member

Race neutrality/colorblindness

"Race man"/color consciousness

Apolitical/non-ideological

Political/ideoligical

Work ethic/willingness to
excert effort

Weak work ethic

Intellectually-oriented/
"candle power"

Anti-intellectual, politicallyoriented/intellectually "soft"

Qualified

Unqualified

Status-quo oriented

Anti-institutional

Good citizen, cooperative,
community builder/colIegial

Bad citizen, uncooperative,
complainer/uncollegial

Institutional team orientation,
institution loyal

Racial group orientation/
racial loyalty

Objectivity

Subjectivity

With the above table in mind,47 assume that the professor, in his
first year of teaching, has been assigned to teach criminal procedure.

46 For a general discussion of how stereotypes affect the employment prospects and
experiences of black men, see Floyd D. Weatherspoon, RemedyingEmployment Discrimination

Against African-American Males: StereotypicalBiases Engendera Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23 (1996).
[
47
According to Kimberl. Crenshaw, " r]acist ideology replicates [a] pattern [characteristic of Western thought] of arranging oppositional categories in a hierarchical order"
and "historically whites represented the dominant antinomy, while Blacks came to be seen
as separate and subordinate." KimberlM Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:

Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. Rxv. 1331, 1373
(1988). Crenshaw captures the concept with the following table:
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One of the first cases he is likely to teach is Terry v. Ohio.48 The case
establishes the stop-and-frisk doctrine. If a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has or is about to engage in criminal con49
duct, she may stop and detain the suspect for limited questioning. If
at any time during the encounter the officer develops reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, she may subject the
suspect to a "frisk"-or a limited search of the suspect's outer clothing, a "patdown."50 In teaching this case, our black male first-year law
professor must at least think about two concerns: whether to employ
the Socratic method and how to teach Tery v. Ohio.
a. Employing the Socratic Method
The Socratic method may not be our hypothetical professor's
preferred pedagogical approach. If he were not worried about issues
of authority in the classroom-and the extent to which his identity
diminishes his professorial standing-he might adopt a less traditional approach. For example, he might break students up into small
group sessions, ask them to discuss the material, and then report back
52
to the class. 51 Given the background assumptions about his identity,
Historical Oppositional Dualities
WHrr IMAGES

BLACK ImAGES

Industrious
Intelligent
Moral
Knowledgeable
Enabling Culture
Law-Abiding
Responsible
Virtuous/Pious

Lazy
Unintelligent
Immoral
Ignorant
Disabling Culture
Criminal
Shiftless
Lascivious

Id.
49

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id. at 30.

50

See i&

48

51 See Lani Guinier, Transcript:Keynote Address by Lani Guinier,25 U. TOL L. REV. 875,
885 (1995) (encouraging law professors to move away from Socratic engagement to a more
conversational and less hierarchical approach);John M. Rogers, Class Participation:Random
Calling and Anonymous Grading,47J. LEGAL EDuc. 73 (1997) (suggesting that class participation should play an important part in the delivery of legal education); Stephanie M.
Wlldman, The Classroom Climate: EncouragingStudent Involvement 4 BERKE=EY WoMEN's LJ.
326 (1989) (same).
52 In the context of the classroom, perhaps the most pervasive stereotypes students
will have about the professor is that he is not competent. But, even to the extent that
students do not hold this negative view, they will likely not assume that the professor is
competent. See Derrick A. Bell, Diversity and Academic Freedom, 43J. L;EGAL EDUC. 371, 377
(1993) (noting the burden of the presumption of incompetence on nonwhite faculty members); Joyce Anne Huges, Neithera Whisper or a Shout, in REBELS IN LAW: VoICES IN HIsroRY
OF BLACK WOMEN LAwYERs 90, 98 (1. Clay Smith Jr. ed., 1998) (observing that "there is no
presumption of competence for Black professors as there is for whites. In fact, there is a
presumption of incompetence").

1282

CORNELL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 85:1259

however, such an approach would not necessarily signal creativity. Instead, it could signal unpreparedness, intellectual "softness," and
disorganization. 53
Moreover, employing the Socratic method effectively is difficult.
But for racial assumptions about his identity, the professor might also
adopt a teaching approach that requires a different kind of (and some
might argue less) intellectual work: lecturing.5 4 It takes a great deal of
work to convey complicated doctrinal ideas through Socratic engagement. A professor must think carefully about the questions, anticipate
the responses, and move the conversation in a coherent and accessible way.5 5 It might be easier and safer for this professor to teach the
material to the students via a lecture. In this way, he remains in con56
trol of the conversation.
Further, the professor might also think that problems with the
Socratic method exist and that it operates to disproportionately benefit insider students. 57 This suspicion might especially be true of classes
with few students of color.58 However, employing a teaching method
other than the Socratic method could result in an image of the professor as nontraditional, illegitimate, intellectually rigid, closed-minded,

53 For a discussion of how the employment of nontraditional classroom pedagogy can
create (or solidify) the impression of a Black professor's incompetence, see Bell, supranote
52, at 377 (describing his teaching experiences at Stanford); see also Reginald Leamon
Robinson, Split Personalities: Teaching and Scholarship in Nonstereotypical Areas of Law, 19 W.
NEw ENG. L. Rxv. 73, 74-77 (1997) (discussing how the author's employment of social
theory in the content of his property class engendered student hostility).
54 But see Pamela J. Smith, Teaching the Retrenchment Generation: When Sapphire Meets
Socrates at the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority, 6 WM. & MARYJ. OF WOMEN & L. 53,
162 (1999) (observing that the employment of the Socratic method confirms the image of
her as "an aggressive and domineering black woman").
55
See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method, 109 HAtv. L. REv. 911, 922 (1996).
56 Note that the professor might also be worried that the use of the lecture format
would result in the impression that he is unreceptive to student ideas. Such an approach
might also encourage his colleagues to take the position that he "spoon feeds" or "condescends to" students.
57 For a discussion of the link between the pedagogical choices law professors make
and the experiences of students of color in the classroom, see generally, KimberI Williams
Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education,11 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
1 (1989); see also Harris, supra note 45, at 342-43 (describing the additional "burdens" and
responsibilities of being a black woman law professor). Cf Lani Guinier et al., Becoming
Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law Schoo 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 19-20 &

n.63 (1994) (suggesting that men speak more than women in the classroom); Elizabeth
Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J.
LE AL EDUC. 1, 45-48 (1998) (same).
58 For example, to the extent that there are few black students in a particular class,
students and sometimes faculty members look to these students for the "black perspective."
And even when students and faculty members do not expect black students to provide the
black perspective, black students will still carry the burden of "representing" race.
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uninterested in student ideas, and unable to think on his feet.5 9 The
employment of the lecture format, in other words, could be inter60
preted as the employment of a script.
b.

Teaching Terry v. Ohio

Terry v. Ohio,61 decided in 1968, involved black defendants. 62 In
teaching the case, one could ignore the political context in which the
case was litigated, 63 the racial dynamics of the encounter between the
defendants and the police, 64 and the race-based way in which Justice

Warren structured the opinion. 65 Alternatively, one could focus on all
these factors. During such a discussion, the black professor might
even reveal his own encounters with the stop-and-frisk doctrine on the
66
streeL

59
Cf. SARA LAwVRENcE-LIGHTFOOT, RESPECT 155-69 (1999) (describing Professor David
Wfllins' reasons for using the Socratic method when he began teaching Civil Procedure at
Harvard Law School).
60
Significantly, the employment of the Socratic method does not mean that the professor escapes any of these criticisms. Clarity can be interpreted as condescension or spoon

feeding; a great amount of student engagement can be interpreted as disorganization or
unpreparedness; asking lots of questions can be interpreted as providing little guidance.
In other words, any pedagogical choice that a faculty member makes will be filtered
through stereotypical prisms. At the extreme, this means that good teaching is what white
men do in the classroom. What black men do is necessarily not good teaching. See Smith,
supra note 54, at 109 n.205 (observing that "Professor Kingsfield [of The Paper Chase],
embodies the prototypical law professor. white, middle aged, and overly-fond of the socratic method"). Consequently, while a white professor is seen to be bold or assertive, a
black one is seen to be out of line or aggressive. While a white professor is seen to be a
strong leader, a black one is looked on as combative. And while a white professor is said to
be skilled at negotiating, a black one is perceived to be unwilling to follow procedure. See
C. Aisha Blackshire-Belay, Under Attack: The Status of Minority Faculty Members in the Academy,
AcADN, July-August 1998, at 30, 32. All of this is to say that there is no strategy that a
Black faculty member can take that renders him invulnerable to stereotypes.
61 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
62 The Court's recitation of the facts does not mention the defendant's race. See id. at
5. However, the trial court record reveals that John Terry was black.
63 For a discussion of the extent to which this historical context of the 1960s shaped
the Court's doctrinal approach in Teny, see Tracey Macin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and PoliceDiscretion72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1271 (1998).
64 See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 962-73 (1999). In many ways, Teny can be conceptualized as a
case about racial profiling. For a discussion of the problems racial profiling present for
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists,
and the Future of the Fourth Amendmen4 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 271, 312-16.
65 See Thompson, supra note 64, at 962-73. But see Sklansky, supra note 64, at 315-16
(arguing that at least the Tery opinion "expressly recognized the problem of police harassment, took note that the problem appeared particularly acute from the vantage point of
black Americans.").
66 See Devon W. Carbado, -racing Suspicion, STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000)
(describing his race-based encounters with the police).
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Assume that student evaluations play an important role in the
tenure and promotion process at this institution. 67 Assume also that
the student body is overwhelmingly white. If so, the professor might
choose not to focus on-or even ignore-the racial aspects of the
68
case. That approach, from our perspective, would be problematic.
Given the professor's fears about what sort of assumptions the students might make if he talks about race, 69 the professor might make
the pragmatic choice to avoid race, for fear that talking about it would
result in his receiving negative evaluations. 70
Suppose, however, that the professor does choose to address the
racial aspects of the case. He thinks that this is the right thing to do
politically, intellectually, and pedagogically. The fact that he makes
this choice, however, does not mean that his pragmatic concerns
about tenure and promotion have disappeared. Instead, the professor
is likely to attempt to negotiate his pragmatic concerns about teaching
evaluations and tenure with his political, intellectual, and pedagogical
concerns about race. He will have to find ways to meaningfully integrate politics, history, and race into a discussion of the narrow doctrinal questions presented by the Terry7 opinion, while avoiding
alienating students or creating the impression that he is partial and
obsessed with race. This approach involves work, which is directly related to the background racial assumptions that people make about
67 We recognize that the importance of teaching evaluations varies from institution to
institution. Moreover, even within a specific institution, teaching evaluations may not be as
important in all cases.
68 Cf.Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 2 (discussing the extent to which avoidance of race
in the classroom entrenches legal "perspectivelessness'---- "an analytical stance that has no
specific cultural, political, or class characteristics").
69 For example, he may fear that the students will think that as a black professor he is
obsessed with race. See Huges, supra note 51, at 101 n.61 (observing that "A survival strategy employed by some [people of color] is 'racelessness'").
70
Cf Linda Crane, Can We Talk?: Reflections of Seven FemaleAfri can Amer can Law Professors, NBA MAG., July 1992, at 16, 19 (observing that "the experiences of relatively new law
teachers indicate that most of their negative race-related encounters of students seem to
have taken the form of unduly harsh written student evaluations"); Elaine Martin, Power
and Authority in the Classroom: Sexist Stereot)pes in TeachingEvaluations,9 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN
CULTURE & Soc'Y 482, 486-87, 491-92 (1984) (arguing that student revenge "plays a large[ ]
part in the evaluations of [woman] faculty who upset students by violating zones of acceptance"); Smith, supra note 54, at 137-200 (discussing how stereotypes of race and gender
shape how students evaluate professors); Ellen K. Solender, The Story of a Self-EffacingFeminist Law Professor,4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 249, 255 (1995) ("Student prejudices continue to
pollute student evaluations, especially when a professor of a different race or culture is
involved."). For scholarship questioning the "fairness, validity, and perhaps legality of using" student's evaluations to make tenure and academic promotional decisions, see James
G.Nimmer & Eugene F. Stone, Effects of GradingPracticesand of Time of Rating on Student
Rating of Faculty Performanceand Student Learning; 32 REs. HIGHER EDUC. 195, 212 (1991).
71 ChiefJustice Warren characterized the question before the Court as "whether it is
always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search
for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15
(1968).
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the professor's identity272 None of the concerns identified in the pre-

ceding paragraphs would apply, at least not in the same way, if this
professor were a white male. 73
2.

The Racial Work of Colorblindness

A more general way to convey this idea relates to the pervasive
notion that our society, our workplace culture, and our social interactions ought to be colorblind. 74 Under a colorblind norm, whites can72 The extra work that outsiders often do in negotiating identity in the classroom
extends beyond the obvious classes like Constitutional Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Law, where it is almost impossible to ignore race and gender issues (although we have seen
it done). Take, for example, the basic Business Associations or Corporations class. Discussion of the corporate-opportunities doctrine is standard fare for this class. Two of the key
cases on the topic are Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter,438 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)
and Broz v. CellularInfo. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996); see also Eric Talley, Turning
Servile Opportunitiesto Gold: A StrategicAnalysis of the CorporateOpportunitiesDoctrine, 108 YALE
L.J. 277, 303-10 (1998) (discussing the cases in detail).
In each case, the issue is the same: Did the defendant abscond with a corporate opportunity? Both cases involve similar situations in that the defendant officers did not disclose their intentions to their corporations prior to taking the opportunities. Yet, despite
the important role that prior disclosure plays in the doctrine, the officer in Porterloses
while the office in Broz wins. See Broz, 673 A.2d at 159; Porter,438 N.E.2d at 395. The
opinion explicitly mentions that Porter, the defendant who loses, is black, the organization
he defects to is associated with Howard University, and the opportunity at issue is a government grant that is part of a minority set-aside program. See Porter,438 N.E.2d at 392-93. In
the case where the defendant wins, race is not mentioned. Although a number of plausible explanations exist for why the cases come out differently, see Talley, supra, at 306-10,
race and hostility towards affirmative action may have played a role.
Our hypothetical black male professor must decide whether to discuss the question of
whether race played a role. If he does, he risks that his insider students will think: Here is
another black man obsessed with race. Unlike with Terry, however, he can avoid talking
about the race question without raising too many eyebrows because race does not play a
role in the standard discussions of the cases. See id. at 303-10. The cost to the professor is
both the struggle he goes through in terms of deciding how and whether to bring up the
race issue (or how to deal with it if a student brings it up) and, assuming he decides to
avoid the issue, having compromised what he may view as his sense of self.
73 This is not to deny that there are likely to be identity performance pressures on, for
example, a white male conservative professor who is trying to negotiate his identity within a
liberal educational institution. A white male professor teaching rape, for example, might
be worried about the extent to which his status as a (white) man might shape the way
students respond to him and the material. SeeJamesJ. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE LJ. 481, 501 (1992). Our point is that a white male
professor is not likely to have to think about identity negotiations to the same extent as a
professor who is not white and male. Cf Linda S. Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and Pedagogical Politics:Lamentations of an African American FemaleLaw Professor,6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ.
81, 82 (1990-91) (observing that the "limited presence [of Black women in the academy]
politicizes the past and present by reminding students, faculty, alumni and others of the
rationales of our historical and current exclusion ....
The ubiquitous white male law
professor arouses no curiosity or attention based solely on his presence").
74 For criticisms of extant notions of colorblindness, see, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of "Our ConstitutionIs Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991); Harris, supra note 8, at 176877; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE LJ. 758; Patricia Williams, The ObligingShell
An InformalEssay on FormalEqualOpportunity, 87 McH. L. REv. 2128 (1989). One could use
gender or sexuality blindness as an alternative norm that is desired.
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not intentionally discriminate against people of color based on race.
They cannot use racial slurs or otherwise engage in overt racial conduct that creates a hostile work environment for people of color. The
colorblind idea does not, however, place an affirmative duty on whites
to interact with people of color, or a negative duty to dissociate and
disidentify themselves from other whites.
Consider, for example, a large law firm's daily lunch rituals.
Given how hard law firm associates work and the limited time they
have to interact with other lawyers in their firm outside of work assignments, eating lunch together becomes an important way for associates
to develop and sustain relationships within the firm. If the firm has a
colorblind workplace norm, it would not be problematic for the same
group of white male associates in the law firm to lunch together everyday. Such racial associations would not run afoul of a workplace norm
of colorblindness. Few white people in the law firm would interpret
these white male, daily lunch gatherings as a form of white racial
bonding or as evidencing a tendency on the part of the white male
associates to form racial cliques. On the contrary, these associations
would likely be understood to reflect the collegiality of the individual
members of the lunch group.
Now suppose that within this same firm some Latinas/os who develop a practice of going to lunch with each other on the first Monday
of every month. This practice may be interpreted as undermining the
law firm's colorblind ideal if they went to lunch with each other everyday. Even a monthly lunch gathering of Latina/o associates might be
viewed as sufficiently disruptive of workplace norms of racial association to create the impression of racial "cliquishness." 75 These Latinas/os might be perceived as "sticking to their own kind." To the
extent that insiders perceive Latinas/os in this way, they (insiders) are
76
also likely to perceive them (outsiders) as uncollegial.
Why do racial associations on the part of whites carry a different
social meaning than racial associations on the part of people of color?
With reference to the above example, one answer might be that the
75
See generally BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, "WnHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SrrrING ToGETHER IN THE CA=RrA?" (1997) (discussing racial-identity development).

76 Commenting on the relationship between race and collegiality within the context
of law faculties, Angela Harris observed:
Each member of a faculty is judged in part on the basis of whether she
or he contributes to collegiality or detracts from it. Collegiality is often a
factor in the tenure decision. Yet, the very appearance of new, "diverse"

people on faculties signals the loss of an older academic community.
Faculty members once took for granted the presence of certain homogeneities of race, gender, sexual orientation, and the rest within their commu-

nity. Minorities in academia sometimes feel themselves to be a threat to
collegiality not only in their actions but in their very existence.
Harris, supra note 36, at 128.
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white associates did not racially define their association as a white-only
association; it just happened that their lunch gatherings were white
and male. With respect to the Latinas/os, however, their monthly
meetings were organized around the very fact of their racial or ethnic
identity.
But this reasoning is unpersuasive. Even a situation involving Latina/o daily lunches that are not organized intentionally along identity lines will still be perceived as racially "cliquish." The reason is that
the social meaning of employee associations-for example, Latina/os
going to lunch together-does not depend solely or most significantly
on the racial intent behind the association, but on the racial composi77
tion of that association.
Why does racial composition matter? Why, in other words, does
the social meaning of the group association turn on the racial composition of the group? The answer relates to the one-directional way in
which the colorblind norm works. The colorblind norm does not require whites to avoid other whites or to associate with people of color.
This norm does, however, require people of color to avoid other people of color (the negative racial duty) and to associate with whites (the
affirmative racial duty). In fact, the colorblind norm operates as a
color conscious burden.78 Colorblindness, therefore, does not actually mean colorblindness. 79 Specifically, it racially regulates the workplace association of people of color, but not those of white people. A
colorblind workplace norm requires people of color, but not white
77 Cf. Frances Olsen, Affirmative Action: Necessary but Not Sufficient, 71 CHIo-KENT L. Rxv.
937, 942 (1996) (describing, within the academic context, how similar information about
insiders and outsiders is often interpreted differently). One might object to the argument
in the text on the grounds that the interpretive spin that is put on the different lunch
associations is a simple matter of probabilities. In other words, in a large workplace that is
dominated by white male employees, it is likely that it is a random occurrence that a group
of white men are having lunch together. Conversely it is a lot less likely that a group of
Latina/os having lunch together at the firm is a random occurrence. But to say that the
different interpretive spins are all about probabilities is to miss the point of the story which
is that the Latina/os having lunch together is more likely to be interpreted at "cliquishness"
(because of preconceptions about people of color) than it would be with a simple probabilistic calculation (of the type of how likely is it that a coin toss will come up either heads or
tails). It is a matter of probabilities, but a complex matter.
78
One can articulate this point more broadly by invoking the notion of "assimilationist bias." For a useful discussion of the ways in which equal protection jurisprudence reproduces assimilationist bias, see generally, Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell , 108 YALE L.J. 485
(1998).
79 See KimberlM Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructinga Pro-Active Defense of AffirmativeAction, 16 NAT'L BLAcK LJ. 196, 199-202 (1999) (discussing the subjectivity inherent in
the notion of colorblindness); Harris, supranote 8, at 1738 (describing how "[w]hiteness as
racialized privilege was ... embraced in legal doctrine as 'objective fact'"); Karst, supra
note 8, at 281-82 (stating that objective fact-finding maintains social status and
subordination).
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people, to think and be careful about their racial associations.8 0 The
question of whether the workplace norm of colorblindness is violated
turns on whether people of color associate with each other or with
whites. Consequently, white-with-white and white-with-people-of-color
associations are perceived as colorblind. People of color-people-ofcolor associations are not.
B. Additional Costs of Working Identity
1. Identity Denials
Identity performances can become a denial of self. As we explain
later, identity negotiations often function to make insiders feel comfortable and at ease with the outsider's difference. Beyond a certain
point, an outsider's efforts to make insiders feel comfortable can
translate into a denial of the outsider's self, or at least the outsider's
80 A recent article by Amy Wax suggests that it may be efficient for people of color to
bear this type of burden. SeeWax, supra note 35, at 1199. Wax's claim is that, to the extent
employers hold unconscious stereotypes about outsiders, those outsiders are likely to be in
the best position to do the work of negating those stereotypes, making them the cheapest
cost avoiders. See id. at 1200-01. While no easy way exists for the employer to correct for
the unconscious biases of its decision makers, Wax argues, outsider employees can effectively negate stereotypes by becoming more productive workers. See id. at 1202. Greater
productivity in turn will increase social welfare. See id. at 1202-03.
Wax's article is important in that it is one of the few to explicitly discuss victim responses and agency in the context of unconscious discrimination. But the efficiency claim
is problematic on multiple grounds. At the least, it minimizes the costs and risks involved
in negating stereotypes. See id. at 1203-06. Negating stereotypes is not a simple matter of
working harder and faster. Further, the tone of the argument suggests that outsiders
should do the work of negating stereotypes. This view fails to recognize that outsiders have
been attempting to do the work of negating stereotypes ever since they were allowed entry
into the workplace and that the results have not been the straightforward increases in
productivity that Wax suggests.
To push the point further, we are unpersuaded by Wax's claim that stereotype-negating behavior by outsiders will enhance efficiency. Take the following examples of the type
of behavior discussed earlier acting docile to negate the stereotype that one is likely to be
violent; purchasing expensive and formal clothes to negate the stereotype that one is likely
to be unprofessional; going drinking with the boys to negate the stereotype that one is
unlikely to be a team player; speaking only English with fellow outsiders to not discomfort
insiders; and eating hamburgers and listening to top-forty music to persuade others of
one's cultural assimilation. The increase in productivity in these actions is difficult to see.
Outsiders do extra work, but that work can often be wasteful, risky, and counterproductive.
Of course, outsiders will undoubtedly also attempt to do more to enhance bottom-line
productivity to negate stereotypes of laziness. But Wax errs in privileging this effect and
giving short shrift to the likelihood of inefficient signaling behavior. See id. at 1204-05.
As Wax herself recognizes elsewhere in the article, stereotypes and unconscious biases
are not problems in those spheres in which cheap and objective measures of productivity
exist. See id. at 1179. It is in those workplaces, in which qualitative evaluations turn on
factors that are difficult to verify and observe (team work, steadiness, dependability, initiative, loyalty), employers are likely to use stereotypes in their decision-making processes. See
Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About RacialDiscrimination?,J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1998, at 91, 96-97; Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture,Information, and Screening
Discrimination,104J. POL. EcoN. 542, 543 (1996). The negation of precisely these factors is
likely to involve the kinds of inefficient signaling on which this Article focuses.
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idealized sense of self. This is not to suggest that people have "true"
identities or essences. Identity is socially constructed. 8 1 Rather, the
point is that most people have experienced what might be referred to
as compromising moments of identity performance-moments in
which a person's performance of identity contradicts some political or
82
social image that person has of herself.
a. Compromising the Sense of Self
Consider a summer-associate event at a law firm, such as an endof-the-summer dinner. Five permanent associates are present: four
white men and one white woman. The summer associate, Debra, is a
black woman, and one of the white male associates informs her that
the firm has decided to extend her a permanent offer to join the firm
upon graduation from law school. Debra is excited. But her excitement is cautious, for she realizes that if she accepts the offer, she will
be one of only two black women and five black people in a firm of
two-hundred attorneys.
As the evening progresses, there are many celebratory toasts.
This firm prides itself on getting summer associates to accept the
firm's offers by the end of dinner. Susan, the white female associate,
wants to know if Debra has seen the new Star Wars movie. She tells
Debra that the firm has lots of tickets and continues: "It's a great
movie. Quite entertaining. The effects and the characters are all
amazing! JarJar Binks was, I thought, very funny." The other associates agree enthusiastically. And they go on at some length about how
"truly great" this movie is.
Debra has, in fact, seen Star Wars. She does not think the movie
was great. On the contrary, she found the movie to be racially problematic and several of the characters to be walking racial stereotypes.
Debra does not express her "true" feelings about the movie, however.
Instead, she escapes the conversation by saying: "Thanks, but I've
seen the film already. At any rate, I'm not a huge fan of the Star Wars
genre."

For Debra, her reaction was a compromising moment of identity
performance.8 3 To respond otherwise might have resulted in the risk
that the associates would consider her racially sensitive, uncollegial, a
81

See, e.g., Kang, supranote 33 (describing the concept of social construction).
As explained, the stronger the stereotypes about one's identity, the weaker that
person's bargaining power with respect to whether and to what extent he or she should
compromise on identity. See supra Part IA-B.
83 It is important to point out that Susan, the white female associate, is also very likely
to be engaged in a series of negotiations. Presumably, as a white woman (and thus an
outsider), she would also be interested, if not racially invested, in fitting in.
82
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potential troublemaker, a radical, a "Sapphire," 8 4 or a "PC-er." Had
Debra not been concerned about the (race-based) costs of offering
her racial analysis of the film she might have volunteered her perspective.8 5 Those background concerns, however, resulted in her performing her identity in a way that was intended to make the white
associates feel racially comfortable (or at least not render them racially uncomfortable). Although this racial-comfort strategy diminished (but did not eliminate) the likelihood that certain racial
stereotypes about black women would be attributed to Debra, the
strategy carried with it another significant cost: the performance of an
identity that is at odds with-indeed a negation of-the social and
political image that Debra has of herself.
b.

Wat to Do About Racial Humor

Consider the case of an insider who tells jokes about a Chinese
character. The insider puts on the stereotypical Chinese accent commonly heard in the movies and on television to describe what the Chinese character says. An outsider hearing this joke could laugh, stay
silent, or point out that the insider is being racist.
If the outsider laughs, the insiders will probably think that he is a
"good guy": someone who can take a joke, a team player who is not
obsessed with race, or a racially-neutral person. 86 If, however, the outsider suggests that the caricature is racist and offensive, then: (1) his
outsider status will be accentuated, (2) his colleagues might conclude
that he cannot take ajoke and is obsessed with race, and (3) insiders
will question whether he can be trusted and are less likely to think
that he is a team player. What does the outsider do under these cir84 See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539, 539-40 (stating a "Sapphire" is a stereotype of a black woman as "tough, domineering, emasculating, strident and

shrill"). The opposite of the Sapphire image is "Mammy." "Mammy was 'the perfect
slave-a loyal, faithful, contented, efficient, conscientious member of the family who always knew her place; and she gave the slaves a white-approved standard of black behavior!'"
Id. at 570 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

85 Consider Patricia William's experience challenging her friend's anti-semitic
comment:
As we argued, words like "overly sensitive," "academic privilege," and

'touchy" began to creep into her description of me ....
She did not use
the word "righteous" but I know that is what she meant. ...
Eventually I felt our friendship being broken apart. ...

Moreover, I

realized that she perceived the very raising of the subject matter as an act of
hostility.
Williams, supra note 74, at 2147; see also Harris, supra note 36, at 126 (observing that

"[c]hallenging bigotry is always difficult, but it is particularly difficult when it means risking
a valued relationship").
86 CfMarinaAngel, Women in LegalEducation: What lt's Like to Be Part of a PerpetualFirst
Wave or the Case ofthe DisappearingWomen, 61 TEmI. L. REv. 799, 831 (1988) (observing that
"[i]fa faculty member doesn't enjoy the littlejokes told about women in the faculty lounge
she is not collegial").
[or] if she doesn't drink beer with the boys ....
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cumstances? Outsiders are confronted with this sort interactional
question on a regular basis.8 7 If the outsider's sense of herself is that
unconstrained by occupational concerns about promotion, she would
be inclined to challenge the race-based humor in our hypothetical
above, remaining silent can become not only a denial of that sense of
self, but also a legitimation of and acquiescence to the implicit racial
terms under which the outsider is expected to work (here, toleration
of racial humor).s

2.

Identity Peformances Can Backfire

Outsiders' working identities also involve two types of additional
risks. First, the risk exists that others will identify the performative
element of an outsider's behavior as strategic and manipulative. Suppose an outsider's colleague is attempting a humorous caricature of a
fellow employee that the outsider thinks is racist. The outsider does
not want to feed her white colleague's stereotype of outsiders as people who are obsessed with race. Therefore, the outsider employee
joins the laughter. If insiders perceive that the laughter is halfhearted
and fake, it may be worse for the outsider's prospects of success in the
workplace than if the outsider had objected to the caricature or refused to laugh. In other words, to the extent that the outsider is perceived as acting strategically, her actions will be discounted and
probably resented.8 9 Therefore, the outsider not only has to perform,
but she has to perform well. 90
87 Significantly, the outsider's response and the employer's interpretation of that response might be a function of the outsider's identity. Thus, perhaps the employer will
expect that black people will participate in jokes about Asian Americans more than Asian
Americans will. In other words, an employer may be racially more disappointed with outsider employees who do not participate in identity-based humor about people whose outsider identity is different from that of the employees.
88 Working within a group almost by definition, requires an individual to compromise
her individual identity to some extent. Outsiders inevitably must make a greater effort to
conform than insiders. But at some point, compromise becomes the denial of a person's
self. See generally Susan E. Babbitt, Moral Risk and Dark Waters, in RACiSM AND PHILOSOPHY
235 (Susan E. Babbitt & Sue Campbell eds., 1999) (exploring the morality of identity construction within a system whose social norms and values define one negatively).
89 See GomAN, supra note 7, at 71 ("If a performance is to come off, the witnesses by
and large must be able to believe that the performers are sincere.").
90 See id. at 33 ("Those who have the time and talent to perform a task well may not,
because of this, have the time or talent to make it apparent that they are performing
well."). Angela Harris made the following point with respect to education work:
I must consider issues of timing. Is this the right moment to speak up? Do
I have enough credibility to make a challenge? I mustjudge the manner of
my challenge. Will anger or soft words be more effective with this person?
Finally, I must ask myself whether I have the resources to handle one more
confrontation...
Harris, supranote 36, at 132-33.
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Second, when multiple interconnected stereotypes operate simultaneously, the risk exists that taking steps to negate one kind of stereotype will activate some other negative stereotype. The point is easiest
illustrated with a series of examples. First, take the case of one of the
few female employees in an organization that values assertiveness.
She recognizes that other women before her have failed in the organization in part because of a stereotype that women are unassertive.
Therefore, she decides to be assertive in her interactions with others;
for example, she asserts herself in meetings and in her dealings with
colleagues and subordinates. The risk is that the woman's male colleagues will not see the assertiveness
as positive, but rather as a sign
91
that she is "bitchy" and "pushy."
Or imagine that in an organization that values both effort and
intellectual ability, a male African-American employee perceives that
negative stereotypes about him exist on both counts. He works longer
hours than normal to negate the stereotype of a lazy African-American
man. But that strategy creates the risk that working late will be interpreted as an inability to get work done as quickly as the others.
Finally, consider a male South-Asian employee who is worried
about the perception of South-Asian men as unusually sexist. In order
to negate that stereotype, he takes up cooking. But instead of negating the stereotype of the sexist South-Asian man, his decision to take
up cooking triggers the colonial image of the servile South-Asian man.
As these examples show, outsiders are typically subject to not one, but
a number of interconnected stereotypes. 92 And it is entirely possible
91

See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 942 (noting that women have a lot of experience

striving to meet ever-changing job requirements).
92 Katharine Bartlett eloquently makes this point with respect to women:
A woman [in a traditionally male workplace] can be neither too much like
a woman nor not enough like one; she must appear competent-and thus
formal, covered, and neutered-but not too assertive or manly-and thus
soft, frilly, and ornamental. She must not distract others with her sexiness,
and thus must be wrapped tight and inaccessible, but she cannot be too
independent, and thus should be appropriately exposed (legs), painted
(eyes, lips, cheeks, hair), elevated (high-heeled shoes), and vulnerable
(clothes that prevent easy movement or escape).
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541, 2547 (1994).
Elsewhere in the same article, Bartlett writes:
The "dress-for-success" literature makes chillingly clear the tightrope women are expected to walk. Women are cautioned to avoid both the "imitation man" look and the feminine look, both of which detract from their
authority. The imitation man look-a shirt and tie, vest, or pinstriped
suit-causes women to look as if they are dressing up in someone else's
(their father's?) suit and thus silly or, in some cases, sexy. It is important
for the individual woman to show-with a skirt, for example-that she is
not departing in too radical or threatening a way from accepted gender
identifications. The feminine look causes a woman to be perceived as a
subjugated object rather than as an authority figure. Thus, women should
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that a strategy to repudiate one stereotype, like laziness, will confirm
93
another, like intellectual incompetence.
C.

Identity Negotiation and Performances, and

Antidiscrimination Law: Problems and Possibilities
94
Having articulated some of the costs of identity performances,
we turn to a concrete conversation about legal doctrine. With respect
to antidiscrimination law, identity negotiations are problematic in at
least three senses. First, identity negotiations involve costs that are not
captured by current antidiscrimination regimes (the "capture problem"). Second, to the extent that a person engages in certain strategic
identity negotiations, she undermines her ability subsequently to
bring a discrimination claim (the "evidentiary problem"). Third, antidiscrimination law reflects the problematic presumption that an employer who hires several outsiders, and fails to promote some is not
motivated by discriminatory reasons (the "doctrinal problem"). 9 5
not wear frilly or lacy blouses, pastel colors, short or long skirts, heavy
makeup, low necklines, open-toed shoes, or boots. The irony is striking:
women have a greater range of dress and appearance options, but with that
freedom a greater possibility of mistake and a narrower range of error than
men.
Id. at 2552-53 (footnotes omitted).
93
The employee may realize that efforts to repudiate one set of stereotypes risk confirming another set. The employee might understand that her behavior will not only be a
function of the signals that the employer looks at-like staying late to signal hard workbut also of how the employer interprets those signals for the specific individual. In other
words, the workplace-incentive system for outsiders is often not the same as the workplaceincentive system for insiders. For example, the African-American employee might not
leave early, but might also feel the need not to be perceived as staying too late.
94 Articles by Katharine Bartlett and Mary Ellen Maatman provide other examples of
the costs that outsiders often bear in negotiating insider expectations. Bartlett's article
describes the costs that result from the heightened physical-appearance standards to which
women are often held. See Bartlett, supranote 92, at 2547, 2562-65. Bartlett states further
that "[t]he medical evidence is overwhelming that women require more body fat as a percentage of their body weight than men do." Id. at 2562. Attempting to achieve these
heightened standards subjects women to a variety of health risks that men are not exposed
to, not to mention the expenditure of money and time. See id. at 2562.
Maatman's article describes the controversy in the deaf culture over the choice between American Sign Language and speech (speaking and lip reading) as a means of communication. See Mary Ellen Maatman, Listening to Deaf Culture: A Reconceptualization of
Difference Analysis Under Title VI, 13 HosrTRA LAB. LJ. 269, 274, 322 (1996). Maatman
describes how, despite the clear superiority of sign language over speech as a mechanism
of communication for the deaf, with the former being a complete language of its own, the
pressures of appearing normal and assimilating have resulted in large investments in
speech for the deaf. See id. at 328-35. The result is not only a second rate mechanism of
communication for the deaf, but also a diversion of resources in both time and money
better used for other purposes. See id. at 335-37.
95 While we suggest that courts are too quick to see evidence of the treatment given to
others in the plaintiff's identity group as circumstantial evidence of the validity of the
plaintiff's discrimination claim, Clark Freshman's recent article argues that courts are reluctant to look to evidence of the treatment of outsiders not in the plaintiff's identity
group. See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories
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This assumption ignores the reality that employers respond not only
to outsider identity status, such as the fact that an employee is black,
but also to outsider conduct, such as whether the outsider is perceived
to be a "good" as opposed to a "bad" black.
1.

The CaptureProblem

Antidiscrimination law is supposed to compensate for the costs
and burdens of discrimination. But it fails to capture the costs of discrimination in at least two ways. First, the law does not take into account the ways in which a colorblind norm burdens people of color.
The law ignores the extra costs to people of color imposed by implicit
workplace expectations that require people of color to associate with
white people and disidentify themselves from other people of color in
order to "blend in."96 It is not that an easy doctrinal solution to this
problem exists. The costs are difficult to quantify, and allocating
blame to any one individual or entity is difficult. Nevertheless, that
97
this issue has largely escaped legal consciousness is problematic.
2.

The Evidentiary Problem

A second problem with the law as it relates to identity negotiation
derives from the negative relationship between an outsider employing
racial comfort strategies and her ability to establish an evidentiary basis for a discrimination claim. The more an outsider negotiates her
identity to make insiders feel comfortable, the more difficult it is for
her to bring a discrimination claim. Suppose, for example, that an
African-American associate perceives that others at his largely white
and male law firm are wary of African Americans. Other employees
Identify DiscriminationandPromote CoalitionsBetween "Different"Minorities,85 CORNELL L. REV.
313 (2000). Evidence of the treatment of other outsiders might suggest the presence of
some generalized outgroup hostility. See id. at 368-69. However, the lack of hostility toward
other outsiders may simply mean that the other outsiders are performing insider identities.
96 See supraPart 111A2.
97 For examples of exceptions in the legal literature, see Bartlett, supra note 92, at
2552-53 (detailing the extra work that women have to do to fit the norms of the maledominated workplace); Cornell & Bratton, supra note 42, at 596 (noting that the United
States expects immigrants to be willing to do the "hard work" of identity reconstruction so
as to assimilate); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grednas: Un/Masking the Self
While Un/braidingLatina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CslcA~o-LATnio L. REv. 1 (1994)
(providing a vivid personal account of the costs of adopting the "masks" of the dominant
culture); Kevin F- Johnson, "MeltingPct" or "Ringof Fire"?: Assimilation and the MexicanAmerican Experience 85 CAr. L. REv. 1259, 1261 (1997) (describing, based on a personal
history, how the current "assimilation paradigm fails to consider the true assimilation difficulties faced by Mexican immigrants and persons of Mexican-American ancestry").
For examples of discussions of identity work outside the legal literature, see Elizabeth
V. Speliman, "Race" and the Labor of Identity, in RACIsM AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 88, at
202, 205, 210, 214 (arguing that blacks often are implicitly required to affirm white superiority) and Babbitt, supranote 88, at 238 (noting that outsiders who are subject to negative
stereotypes often bear an extra "burden of explanation" in their interactions with insiders).
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seem ill at ease in their conversations with him and get especially nervous when talking about issues relating to race. In order to put his
colleagues at ease-to make them racially comfortable-this associate
begins to make jokes containing negative stereotypes of African Americans. The strategy works. Indeed, it opens the door for his colleagues to make similar jokes. If this employee ever brings a racebased discrimination suit, he will unlikely be able to point to these
jokes as evidence of a hostile workplace. 98 After all, not only did he
start the cycle of jokes, but he laughed at the jokes made by his coworkers. The fact that his strategy to tell race-based jokes was a response to the racial dynamics of his workplace and, more specifically,
to the fact that his colleagues were uncomfortable with him because
he is black are obscured in all of this.

98 Courts often find evidence of racist, sexist, or homophobic jokes relevant in discrimination cases. See, e.g., Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir.
1999); Brown v. Middaugh, 41 F. Supp. 2d 172, 187 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Odom v. St. Louis
Community College, 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D. Mo. 1999), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th
Cir. 2000). Courts discount such evidence if the plaintiff has participated in creating an
environment that fosters such jokes. See Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, Inc., 953
F. Supp. 1438, 1450 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
The context in which such discounting of evidence has been the most obvious has
been that of sexual harassment. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986),
the Supreme Court explicitly said that a harassee's performance could be relevant in a
sexual harassment claim to address the question of whether the allegedly harassing conduct was "welcomed" by the plaintiff or not. The Court stated:
While 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent is not a defense to [a sexual
harassment] claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether
he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome.
Id. Following Meritor,there have been multiple occasions on which courts have denied the
sexual harassment claims of plaintiffs who were determined to have welcomed the sexual

advances of others. See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 156364 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc.,
No. 81-268 C(5), 1982 WL 166, *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 1982). Perhaps the most aggreious
example of the use of this "welcomeness" doctrine was in Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th
Cir. 1991). Jo Ann Reed, a female civilian jailer, was subject to deplorable harassmentshe had a cattle prod with an electrical shock put between her legs, her harassers grabbed
her head and shoved it in their laps, and she was handcuffed to a toilet while her harassers
pushed her face into the water. See id. at 492. Reed explained that she did not complain
about the harassment because "it was real important to [me] to be accepted. It was important to me to be a police officer and if that was the only way that I could be accepted, I
wouldjust put up with it and kept [sic] my mouth shut." Id. Instead of focusing on the
harassers' actions, however, the Seventh Circuit panel honed in on the fact that Reed had
used offensive language, engaged in "exhibitionistic" behavior, given "suggestive" gifts, and
engaged in other sexual conduct. Id. at 491. The court rejected the argument that Reed
was performing to fit in as an outsider. She had participated in conduct that the court
considered inappropriate and sexually provocative and that negated her claim. Cf
Christina A. Bull, Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment
PlaintifrsSpeech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 117, 150 (1993) (stating that "blending into her surroundings" by participating in
questionable conduct "is a woman's first defense against sexual harassment").
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There is another, more general way to articulate the evidentiary
problem. Imagine a predominately white firm in which Johnny, a
black associate, engages in racial comfort strategies. If Johnny subsequently brings a discrimination suit, the employer is likely to advance
something like the following race-neutral claim:
We never sawJohnny in racial terms. Just the opposite. Johnny was
one ofus. He fitted in really well. He never engaged in identity politics.

Unlike Toney, another black associate at our firm, Johnny was not
at all interested in working on the diversity committee. Nor was he
interested in mentoring young black associates. Johnny was a colorblind kind of guy. Race really didn't matter to him. It was incidental.
He transcendedhis race. To be perfectly honest, and I know this is
going to sound silly, I never thought ofJohnny as a black guy. He was
just a guy. Everyone as far as I can tell liked him. And certainly no
one would have any reason to discriminate against him. The reasons he did not make partner have nothing to do with his race.
Johnny simply did not make the kinds of relationships with the partners that one needs in order to make partner. Hejustfrll through the
cracks. We regret what happened, but it was a function of the nature
99
of today's large law firms and not of his race.
Racial comfort strategies make white people comfortable because the
corollary of racial comfort is deracialization. 0 0 Because he employed
racial-comfort strategies, Johnny became "one of us," and 'Just a guy";
he was "e-raced" or "deracialized."
ButJohnny's insider and colorblind status is only illusionary. He
can never truly become "one of us" or completely deracialized.
Johnny always faces the risk of a moment of racial disruption in which
his blackness signifies racial difference. We saw an extreme version of
this in the context of the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Simpson's status
as an "honorary white" was disrupted by the allegation that he was a
99 This is a caricature of the narrative of Larry Mungin's discrimination case. See
Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Wilkins, supra note 34,
at 1935 (exploring the implications of the "justfell through the cracks" excuse in the Mungin case). Commenting on the so-called "Queen Bee" syndrome, Marina Angel makes a
related point:
Some of the women who survived the hiring and tenuring processes
did so because they adopted a male style or one that was not threatening to
male faculty members. These women are on the faculty because they are
'one of the boys" or serve as a cheerleader for the boys. The label "Queen
Bee" has been used to describe this type of senior woman .... Male faculty
members often look to this woman for assurance that what they are doing is
right, that they are not discriminating against women.
Angel, supra note 86, at 831 (footnote omitted).
100 See Smith, supra note 54, at 213 (arguing that "[b] lack women can choose to stop
'playing small' so that others, be they white students or colleagues, feel more comfortable
in their presence. It is only through the sense of racial isolation, retrenchment, and the
presumption of incompetence that Black women are perceived as threatening, angry, and
unintelligent").
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criminal and violent black man who murdered Nicole Brown Simpson, an innocent white woman.10 1 However, it would be difficult for a
plaintiff to use a theory of racial disruption to prove employment discrimination, especially if she engaged in racial-comfort strategies that
102
enable an employer to tell the colorblind narrative outlined above.
3.

The DoctrinalProblem

Antidiscrimination law places the following question at the center
of any claim of discriminatory treatment: Was there intentional discrimination based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected class,
such as race, gender, or disability? It is not intentional discrimination
for an employer to dismiss or deny promotion to a minority employee
if the reason for the dismissal was not the employee's race or gender,
but the employer's dislike of the individual. But how does one distinguish between a dismissal based on pure dislike and a dismissal based
on dislike that was animated by race or gender prejudice?
The distinction is obvious if the employer publicly announces "I
dislike blacks" or "I will never promote a woman," but few employers
are likely to make such statements publicly. In most cases, plaintiffs
have to rely on circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination-evidence of how the other employers treated members of the
alleged victim's group. Therefore, courts would probably treat evidence that a law firm has rejected dozens of qualified black associates
for partnership, but promoted the majority of qualified white associates, as evidence of racial animus.
101

See Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, in BLAcK
A CmTICAL READER 172 (Devon W. Carbado ed.,
1999) (discussing how the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson disrupted OJ. Simpson's status as an honorary white). Admittedly, the Simpson case is not necessarily the best case to
test the notion of racial disruption because, among other reasons, the case involved a very
serious crime, murder. An interesting test case would involve Michael Jordan explicitly
identifying himself with traditional black community politics or criticizing Nike's racially
targeted advertising. Would either of these political moves cause racial disruption? See
HAZEL V. CARBY, RACE MEN 2-3 (1998) (suggesting that Michael Jordan represents a depoliticized image of black masculinity which helps to explain his status as an icon).
102 A critic might validly ask whether, to the extent the black employee takes pains to
conform his behavior to that of the white employees, it will be easierfor the black employee
to argue that his failure to receive the promotion was based on race alone. After all, the
black employee did everything as if he were white and still did not receive the promotion.
An example illustrates why the answer is no. If the black associate brings a discrimination
lawsuit against the firm, the firm will counter by saying that although they liked the associate, things just did not work out. Their promotion process involves sponsorship and a vote
by all the current partners, and at the end of the dayJohnny simply did not have enough
support. Nothing racial occurred because white male associates slip through the cracks all
of the time, too. This explanation, as illustrated by the appellate court opinion in the
Mungin case, works to negate any starting presumption of racism. Instead, the claim is that
it was just the system. Thus, the black plaintiff is likely to lose. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SExuAr.
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An employer that has a record of promoting black employees is
likely to persuade a court that insufficient evidence of racial animus
exists. The court assumes that, because the employer thinks that
some blacks are "good," the reason the employer thought the plaintiff
was "bad" had nothing to do with the plaintiff's race. The court is
likely to conclude that the reason for the termination was simply the
employer's dislike of the individual, which does not produce an ac03
tionable discrimination case.'
The flaw in the hypothetical court's analysis is in its narrow conception of what race is or, as some would say, in its "essentializing." If
judges understand the protected categories instead as at least partially
comprised of performances, they might begin to appreciate the extent
to which the subjects of those categories strategically perform their
identities in ways that move them closer or farther away from the core
understanding or stereotypical version of what those categories are
perceived to be about. 10 4 To make this concrete, if ten black employees are up for promotion, and nine are promoted, a court should still
not negate the possibility that the tenth was denied a promotion because of his race: The other nine may have been engaged in racially
palatable identity performances.
Strictly speaking, the problem is in the application of the doctrine and not in the doctrine itself. Indeed, Tile VII already reflects
the notion that it is unlawful for an employer to use race-based stereotypes to disadvantage employees. 10 5 However, courts, for the most
part, have not evidenced an interest or willingness to respond to cases,
like our hypothetical, wherein the discrimination may be a function of
10 6
identity work.
103 The classic articulation of this position is in St. Mary'sHonorCenter v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 506-512 (1993).
104 A vivid description of the importance of performance is contained in Ariela Gross's

description of nineteenth-century trials of whiteness, where the question of how the subject
behaved on a day-to-day basis was a crucial element of the determination. See Ariela J.
Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determinationin the Nineteenth-Century South, 108
YAtE LJ. 109, 156-77 (1998). See alsoJohn Tehranion, Note, PerformingWhiteness, 109 YALE
LJ. 817 (2000).
105 See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59-60 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1174 (2000) (describing the doctrinal framework under which the use of
sex-or-race based stereotypes to disadvantage an employee constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII).
106 There is a set of older gender discrimination cases from the 1970s, in which the
courts showed some willingness to tackle the performance issue. However, the reach of the
doctrine created in those cases-often referred to as the "sex-plus" cases-has been
sharply circumscribed. See, e.g., Maatman, supra note 94, at 276-308 (discussing the evolu-

tion of the sex-plus doctrine). The cases in this category tended to involve employers who,
while otherwise employing substantial numbers of women, discriminated against subcategories of women, such as those with child-care responsibilities or married women. See,
e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1194-98 (7th Cir. 1971).
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IV
CATEGORIZING PERFoRMANcEs: A CLOSER
LOOK AT STRATEGIES

This Part expands upon the claim that institutional norms can
shape employee performances. The starting point is the observation
that one cannot precisely predict how an employee interested in advancement ill perform her identity. Employees interested in advancement within a particular institution are likely to have multiple

performance strategies available to them. More than one way to play
with race to achieve the specific bottom line of getting promoted is
likely to exist.
The standard defense of the employer to a claim of gender discrimination in such a
case was a version of the following- "I employ lots of women and treat them well. Indeed, I
employ more women than men and probably treat them better than the men. How can
you accuse me of discriminating against women just because I do not hire women with
significant child-care responsibilities?" The courts have had little difficulty rejecting this
argument, in its various forms, on the ground that the discrimination lies in the fact that a
stereotype is being applied to women-women with child-care responsibilities are likely to
shirk at the workplace-that is not being applied to men. See, e.g., Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544
(holding that Title VII does not permit "one hiring policy for women and another for
men"). To articulate this in performance terms, the courts were able to recognize that
women who performed in a certain way, such as by having children or by getting married,
were being stereotyped.
Little hope exists, however, that the sex-plus category will be extended to cover anything but a narrow range of performances. While courts have been willing to read the sexplus doctrine as covering cases involving sex plus some other protected category, like race
or age, they have been hostile to requests that they extend the doctrine to cover day-to-day
performances of identity, like dress, appearance, and language. See Bartlett, supra note 92,
at 2556-57 (describing how courts consistently reject challenges to employers' dress-andappearance requirements, often on the grounds that these requirements involve "trivial"
matters of "personal preference" that the employee can change "at will" (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Maatman, supranote 94, at 295-309 (describing the
hostility that courts have shown both to grooming-and-dress requirements and to language
requirements; see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A HairPiece: Perspectiveson the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DuKE LJ. 365, 371 (noting that courts "often accord the greatest deference to [employer-mandated hair and dress] codes that classify individuals on the basis of
socially-conditioned rather than biological differences"). Indeed, some courts have explicitly limited the reach of the sex-plus doctrine to cases in which the "plus" involves an immutable characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right or a policy that only applies to
one sex that significantly deprives that sex of employment opportunities. See Gerdom v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234,
1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
To the extent there is hope, it comes from a subset of the sexual-orientation discrimination cases suggesting that discrimination against someone because he is gay is in effect
discrimination based on the identity according to an unacceptable script for a member of
his gender. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259-60 (1st
Cir. 1999). But see Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition).
This, then, raises complicated questions relating to the distinction between status and conduct. Although an adequate discussion of these complexities is beyond the scope of this
Article, we are currently working on a fuller treatment of antidiscrimination law and its
relationship to identity performance in a separate article.
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Some individuals will face more constraints on the number of
roles they can take on than others face, depending on their race and
the institutional context involved. Even for the highly constrained,
however, broad categories of behavior are likely available to employees who are interested in advancement. By delineating the contours
of each category, we hope to reveal just how pervasive and compli10 7
cated identity-performance strategies can be.
Two caveats are in order. First, performing well-to the extent
that "well" is defined as success in an insider environment, such as an
elite law firm-is difficult. Performing one's outsider status in a way
that satisfies insiders requires care. As with acting, the ability to negotiate different institutional cultures takes skill. The individual must
acquire that skill or cultural capital.' 0 8 That easy ways to acquire or
learn that skill exist is by no means clear.
Second, generalizing about the kinds of strategies outsiders will
adopt in the face of prejudice is not easy. The strategies outsiders
employ will depend on context-factors such as the norms of the institution in question, the specific characteristics of that outsider, and
the prejudices he or she is subject to. Nevertheless, setting out the
basic categories of strategies that outsiders might adopt to combat
prejudice is useful. All these strategies fall along a continuum. The
individual and institutional context will determine which strategy, if
any, the outsider in question chooses.
A.

Strategic Passing

Passing refers to the phenomenon of fooling insiders into believing that an outsider is one of them. Passing is a 100%-comfort strategy because the outsider pretends to be an insider. 10 9 For example, a
light-skinned African American may pass for white, a homosexual may
pass as a heterosexual, a Hindu may pass as a Muslim, a Jew may pass
as a gentile, or a man may pass as a woman. An interesting question is
when individuals choose to "pass" in order to gain entry into, or success within, the workplace. But the 100%-passing strategy applies only
to a small subset of outsiders, because most outsiders cannot totally
107

For an alternative delineation of outsider identity strategies (or "stances toward

identity"), see Peter Margulies, The Identity Question,MadelineAlfight's Past, and Me: Insights
from Jewish and African American Law and Literature, 17 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 595, 599-601
(1997) (describing three outsider stances towards identity--"shame, acknowledgment, and
engagement").
108 The skill necessary to negotiate a cultural context is a productive asset for the individual and therefore is described as a form of "cultural capital." The term "cultural capi-

tal" appears to originate with Pierre Bourdieu, who used it to refer to forms of cultural
knowledge, competencies or dispositions. Randal Johnson, Editor's Introduction to PiERRE
BouRmEu, THE FIEuD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 7 (RandalJohnson ed., 1993).
109 This, in turn, leads to the complex question of when a person begins to internalize
the role he is playing to such an extent that the role takes over his identity.
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fool insiders. Moreover, the feedback effects are minimal because insiders see only another insider. They do not see an outsider whose
behavior either confirms, rejects, or modifies their prejudgments
about that category of outsiders. Our focus, therefore, will be on partial passing strategies, where the outsider's status is known, but he or
she can take actions to modify the social meaning of or stereotypical
assumptions about that status.
B.

Comforting

Outsiders perform comforting acts to make insiders comfortable
with their outsider status. 110 Unlike the total passing context, it is
clear that the person performing comforting acts is an outsider."'
But the outsider has some room to work her identity to make the in110 See Freshman, supra note 95, at 400 (describing literature on how outsiders often
seek to comfort insiders about their difference). Some commentators have suggested that
insider employers may expect this comfort. In this sense, the performance of racial-comfort strategies can be understood as an unstated racial term of employment, "shadow
work." Spelman, supra note 97, at 209-10 (employing the concept of "shadow work" to
comment on the invisibility of the work blacks often have to do to confirm "innate white
superiority"); cf. GoFrmAN, supra note 7, at 109 ("It is understood in many establishments
that not only will workers be required to produce a certain amount after a certain length of
time but also that they will be ready, when called upon, to give the impression that they are
working hard at the moment."). Goffman goes on to argue: "Make-work, along with other
aspects of decorum in work places, is usually seen as the particular burden of those of low
estate." Id. at 110.
111 Even if the insider expects to be comforted, he may not want that comfort to be
achieved by any means necessary. He may prefer that the outsider not "trespass" or totally
pass. Cheryl Harris describes her grandmother's passing in 1930s America as a kind of
trespass:
Her fair skin, straight hair, and aquiline features had not spared her
from the life of sharecropping into which she had been born in anywhere/
nowhere, Mississippi-the outskirts of Yazoo City. But in the burgeoning
landscape of urban America, anonymity was possible for a Black person
with "white" features. She was transgressing boundaries, crossing borders,
spinning on margins, traveling between dualities of Manichean space, rigidly bifurcated into light/dark, good/bad, white/Black. No longer immediately identifiable as "Lula's daughter," she could thus enter the white
world, albeit on a false passport, not merely passing, but trespassing.
Harris, supra note 8, at 1710-11. Insiders expect that their racial comfort will be produced
by social interactions within which markers of status difference are clearly identifiable. Cf
Gor'MAN, supra note 7, at 59 ("Sometimes when we ask whether a fostered impression is
true or false we really mean to ask whether or not the performer is authorized to give the
performance in question."). The comfort that insiders derive from partial passing is based
notjust on the fact that, for example, a black person is being "racially good" but also from
the fact that the person being "racially good" is identifiably black. Cf Anthony Paul Farley,
The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REv. 457, 464 (1997) (observing that white people
derive race pleasure from black subordination); Smith, supra note 54, at 124 n.272 (observing "[a]s whites often expect Blacks to smile, when blacks instead 'display a more affectively neutral, dominant expression,' the contradiction between the expectation and the
reality may cause whites to interpret 'Blacks' facial expressions as unfriendly'").
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sider feel at ease. 112 For example, a perception may exist that AsianAmerican scientists tend to be conflicted about their loyalty to the
United States. 1" 3 Assume that promotion in a scientific laboratory involved in weapons research is a function of success on the most important projects. Junior scientists are picked for these projects not only
on the basis of their scientific abilities, but also for their trustworthiness and the ability to work in teams. Assume that the junior AsianAmerican scientists at the laboratory are thought to be exceptional in
terms of scientific ability-an assumption perhaps based on a stereotype-but they are not deemed trustworthy or known as team players.
What kinds of strategies might the junior Asian-Americans take in order to comfort (appear less foreign and more "American" to) their
114
seniors?
They could emphasize the fact that they attended American colleges, were members of fraternities, or played stereotypically American team sports like American football and baseball. They could
avoid associating with Asian Americans and instead associate only with
white mainstream Americans. They could alter their Asian names to
more "American sounding" names. They could also announce that
they have never visited Asia and do not speak Asian languages. They
could make fun of stereotypical Asian accents. They could claim to
dislike spicy Asian foods and to prefer hamburgers. 1 5
All these actions may serve to comfort insiders and assure them
that the outsider is more of an insider (or at least a particular kind of
outsider)-hence, the term "partial passing." These are actions that
may make the outsider "one of the guys,"1" 6 despite his outsider sta112
See Smith, supra note 54, at 118 n.243 (suggesting that the limited identity options
for Black women "suggest[s] that many senior Black women have survived and excelled in
the legal academia by consciously or subconsciously deciding to manipulate perceptions by
becoming more like Mammy").
113
An example is the recent controversy of suspected Chinese nuclear espionage
against the United States. See, e.g., Daniel Elaidman, The Nuclear Spy Case Suffers a Meltdown:
Did InvestigatorsUnfairly Single Out a Chinese-AmericanScientist as a Suspected Agent of Beijing.,
NEWsWEEK, Aug. 80, 1999, at 31. See also Neil Gotanda, Racidalizationof Asian Americans and
African Americans: RacialProfiling and the Wen Ho Lee Case, 47 UCLA L. Rxv. 6 (forthcoming 2000) (discussing the Wen Ho Lee case as a form of racial profiling).
114
See Chew, supranote 23, at 24-25 (describing the perception of Asian Americans as
foreigners); see also CHANG, supra note 23, at 1-6.
115 One might ask: What about outsider men dating white women? This question is
more complicated. Certain actions that mimic insider behavior create comfort because the
outsider becomes just like an insider. But certain other mimicking actions-such as outsider men dating white women-may cause discomfort to insiders. See, e.g., Carbado, supra
note 101, at 172-73 (discussing this in the context of the O.J. Simpson murder case). Once
again, the interpretation and level of discomfort will depend on the context (the specific
outsider category).
116 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 92, at 2547 (discussing the self-presentation strategies
women employ to fit into male dominated institutions).
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tus. 1 i7 According to Goffman, such actions allow the outsider to fit in.
Depending on how successful the outsider is at partially passing, he
may even become an "honorary" insider." 8
As noted, a 100%-comfort or-passing strategy does not force an
insider to challenge stereotypes that he holds about outsiders, because
the insider does not know he is interacting with an outsider. But partial passing strategies are also not very effective in forcing the employer to rethink his assumptions about outsiders. Partial passing
strategies provide a political opportunity for insiders to engage in outsider exceptionalism. More concretely, these strategies allow insiders to
make the following kinds of statements: 'Ve like you despite your being [gay, lesbian, Asian American, Latina/o, etc.]," or 'e
don't really
think of you as [gay, lesbian, Asian American, Latina/o]." 1 9 Such
sentiments, in turn, allow insiders to say things like, "How can you say
that I'm being [racist, homophobic, sexist, etc.]?" Another common
saying is: "I am best friends with [name of the African-American, lesbian, or heterosexual woman who engages in "passing" that makes insiders comfortable]." An employee's use of partial comforting
strategies provides employers with a way to avoid confronting their use
of stereotypes. In the face of such strategies, employers might tell
themselves that, while the stereotypes they hold about outsiders may
not (for the moment)120 apply to the specific outsider employee, the
stereotypes are nevertheless valid. The partially passing outsider employee thus becomes the exception to otherwise valid stereotyping
12 1
rules.
The discussion of partial passing strategies once again invites consideration of the question of intentionality. With respect to partial
passing and intentionality, there are three categories of employees
with whom one might be concerned: (1) employees who intend to
117

Cf ERVING GOFFeMAN, SIGMA: NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOIE

IDENTTY 49

(1963). According to Goffman,
[The) visibility [of stigma] must be distinguished from one of its particular
bases, namely, obtrusiveness. When a stigma is immediately perceivable,
the issue still remains as to how much it interferes with the flow of interaction. For example, at a business meeting a participant in a wheelchair is
certainly seen to be in a wheelchair, but around the conference table his
failing can become relatively easy to disattend.
Id. Goffman's suggestion, here, seems to be that there are self-presentational strategies
one can employ to "disattend" identity differences or outsider status.
118 See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the O.J. Simpson case).
119 See Charles R. Lawrence, IIl, The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism in CmcAL RAcE THEORY, supra note 5, at 236 (describing instances in

which he has received the following compliment: "I don't think of you as a Negro").
120 See supranotes 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing racial disruption).
121 This suggests that the often made claim, "I am not prejudiced against outsider
group A because I am best friends with X, Y, & Z, who are all from that group," means
something different when X, Y, and Z have engaged in partial passing strategies, than when
they have not.
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partially pass, (2) employees who engage in certain conduct with an
awareness that, but not because, such conduct can be interpreted as
partial passing, 122 and (3) employees who have no clue as to how their
conduct might be interpreted. We do not intend to attach normative
judgment to employees in any of the foregoing categories. 123 The focus thus far has been on the first category, because the employees in
this category are probably responding to the incentive system described in Part II.124 But even if the employee is not responding to a
workplace incentive system, and the employee does not intend to partially pass, the very fact that insiders may interpret her conduct as partial passing should raise concerns for antidiscrimination proponents.
Even without any intentionality on the employees' part, their professional standing within an institution can be enhanced or diminished
depending on whether and to what extent their workplace conduct
125
can be interpreted as partial passing.
C.

Using Prejudice

Thus far, we have discussed employee actions that operate to negate stereotypes. But, under some circumstances, employees might be
able to use stereotypes to their "advantage." Within competitive environments, where advancement is a function of the kinds of projects to
which an employee is assigned, insiders inevitably benefit from the
negative prejudices against outsiders. Other things being equal, an
122 An easy example here is the case of an outsider who plays basketball with the awareness that it makes him "one of the boys." Our point is not to suggest that this employee
should not play basketball. A feeling of camaraderie and trust among employees may be
efficiency enhancing. Moreover, the employee probably enjoys playing ball. Basketball
might be an important part of his social identity.
123
Different partial passing strategies are unlikely to be the same in terms of the damage they can do to individual and group identity. It is one thing for a person to strategically play basketball to partially pass. Things get more complicated and problematic when
it comes to altering one's name, and much more complicated and problematic when one
does things like denigrate one's community in order to fit in and distance oneself from
identity politics.
124 See supra Part ILB-D.
125 Kenji Yoshino offers a typology similar to the passing/partial-passing typologies employed in this paper. According to Yoshino:
[T]here are (at least) three different kinds of assimiliationist bias . . .
[:]converting, passing, and covering. Converting bias means that a group s
asked to change the trait that defines it. Converting bias is at issue, for
example, when gays are forced into pyschotherapy to alter their sexual orientation. Passing means that a group is forced to hide its identity. Passing is
at issue, for example, when gays are permitted to serve in the military as
long as they do not disclose their orientation. Covering means that a group
is permitted both to retain and articulate its identity as long as it mutes the
difference between itself and the mainstream. Covering is at issue, for example, when an employer retains "out" gays, but not a lesbian who "flaunts"
her homosexuality by entering into a public commitment with her same-sex
'lover.
Yoshino, supra note 78, at 500 (footnotes omitted).
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insider with the presumption that he is likely to be collegial, teamoriented and trustworthy is more likely to be selected for a desirable
project than an equivalent outsider. But this result is no more than a
function of insider privilege. 12 6 The use of stereotypes by outsiders is
more interesting. For example, the Korean American who is stereotyped as being hard-working, technically inclined, uncreative, and
lacking in leadership skills might be able to take limited advantage of
this otherwise negative image. Take an organization in which work is
done in teams and a select few of these employees are later promoted
to leadership positions. Teams need leaders as well as followers.
Teams need creativity, but they also need someone to do the unpleasant, boring and technical tasks. The Korean American may think that
it is best for him to portray himself as technically oriented and lacking
in creativity in order to gain an advantage for the nonleader slot.
One cost of this type of behavior is confirming prejudice. The
outsider may succeed in obtaining ajob or a promotion, but he ends
up confirming a stereotype that may have overall negative effects. For
example, by confirming the "drone" stereotype, he will hurt other Korean-American employees' chances of competing for a leadership position. In other words, to the extent that the Korean American
strategically presents himself as technically oriented, not only does he
entrench the drone stereotype, he establishes racial precedent within
his workplace culture for the performance. 127 This precedent will
burden other Korean-American employees. Still, it is not easy to assess the cost-benefit analysis, even from the community's point of
view. After all, attaining economic success also has value for members
128
of a disadvantaged group.

126 Increasingly, scholars of discrimination are moving away from animus- or intentbased models to models that focus on privilege. See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 1.
127
Cf PATRiciAJ. WILLiAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND R GHTS 9-10 (1991). Williams
recounts an episode in which her colleague laments the fact that his school had not hired
more blacks like her. She writes:
A man with whom I used to work once told me that I made too much of my
race. "After all," he said, "I don't even think of you as black." Yet, sometime later, when another black woman became engaged in an ultimately
unsuccessful tenure battle, he confided to me that he wished the school
could find more blacks like me. I felt myself slip in and out of shadow, as I
became nonblack for purposes of inclusion and black for purposes of exclusion; I felt the boundaries of my very body manipulated, casually inscribed
by definitional demarcations that did not refer to me.
Id. Quite apart from any intentionality on Williams's part, her representation of blackness
had created a racial precedent against which other blacks would be compared.
128
See Michele Wallace, Negative Images: Towards a Black Feminist Cultural Citicism, in
TM CULTURAL STUDIES READER 118, 122-24 (Simon During ed., 1993) (suggesting that,
notwithstanding Oprah Winfrey's success, she has entrenched, if not legitimized, negative
stereotypes about black women).
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Other Strategies: Discomfort, Selling Out, and Buying Back

Three other strategies deserve mention. First, some outsiders
may adopt a discomfort strategy. The outsider may choose to emphasize his or her outsider status in a way that makes insiders uncomfortable. The outsider may, for example, consistently point out instances
of unfairness against outsiders. Most people tend to think of such
behavior as authentic or politically principled. Often times it is. But
sometimes such behavior is strategic in that the goal may be to satisfy
an institutional need. To the extent the institution can handle some
dissent, the discomfort strategy may work to provide the institution
with legitimacy, by creating the image of a democratic institution, for
example. Outsiders also might adopt the discomfort strategy as a way
to set the ground work for a discrimination claim by identifying and
calling attention to examples of discrimination within the institution.
Second, there is the "sell-out" strategy. An outsider can make arguments that work to the advantage of insiders so that insiders can
then claim that their arguments are not purely self interested or even
racial. For example, a claim made by an insider in a predominantly
white institution concluding that a particular (racial) episode was not
racial does not carry as much weight as a similar claim made by an
outsider. The argument might be employed, explicitly or implicitly,
to legitimize the insider's perspective. 12 9 The employee may be rewarded for selling out. Many believe that former President Bush rewarded Clarence Thomas, a black man, for selling out by nominating
him to the Supreme Court.8 0 In this sense, selling out might be
thought of as a specific kind of comfort strategy. However, given the
pervasive pop cultural and political use of the term, the phenomenon
deserves separate analytical attention.
Third, a "buy-back" strategy may be adopted by outsiders who
think their performance of comfort strategies may have resulted in
costs to their community and want to make amends. These individuals may engage in both comfort and discomfort strategies. For example, the Asian American who emphasizes his technical skills to take
advantage of the stereotype that Asian Americans are good at technical subjects may recognize the costs of his actions and support other
outsider claims of institutional discrimination to buy back or make
amends for the cost. A more cynical view is that an outsider who en129
Compare this with the situation in which the outsider is arguing that there is discrimination. Here, the outsider story is suspect and needs white racial authentication. See
Carbado, supra note 1 (manuscript at 122-23).
130 See Manning Marable, ClarenceThomas and the CrisisofBlack PoliticalCulture, in RACEingJustice, En-genderingPower: EssAYs ON ANrA HiuL, CA.ENcE: THOMAS, AND THE CONSrRUCTION OF SocLAL REA=r 61, 62 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("Clarence Thomas's climb
to power is directly related to his abandonment of the principles of the black-freedom
struggle.").
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gages in comfort strategies may engage in some visible discomfort
strategies to retain status in the outsider community, while simultaneously maintaining a certain amount of legitimacy within the insider
institution.
Of course, the outlined strategies are situationally driven. How
an outsider performs these strategies will depend on the specific institutional context. Different institutions have specific norms, values,
structures, and cultures that create incentives for employees to behave
in particular ways.
CONCLUSION

Workplace discrimination is driven by more than the physiological markers of outsider difference. It is also driven by the ways in
which outsiders perform their workplace identities. By this, we do not
mean to suggest that outsiders invite discrimination by performing
their identities in certain ways; rather, they are disciplined13' for not
performing their identities in ways that are palatable to their insider
employers. The result is that outsiders, to the extent they wish to survive in the workplace, often find themselves having to do extra work to
make themselves palatable and their insider employers comfortable.
This extra work is directly linked to colorblind and assimilationist
workplace norms.
As things stand, the law does little to address the extent to which
outsiders are burdened by identity performance. In this sense, identity
performances constitute a form of "shadow work"-largely unacknowledged and thus unregulated. To the extent the law has recognized the extra burdens of identity performance, it has been in
131

Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham provide the following account of disciplinary power:
Discipline, rather than being constituted by 'minor offenses,' is characteristically associated with 'norms', that is, with 'standards' that the subject
of a discipline come to internalise or manifest in behaviour, for example
standards of tidiness, punctuality, respectfulness, etc. These standards of
proper conduct put into place a mode of regulation characterised by interventions designed to correct deviations and to secure compliance and confortity ... It is though the repetition of normative requirements that the
'normal' is constructed and thus discipline results in the securing of
normalisation by embedding a pattern of norms disseminated throughout
daily life and secured through survellance.
'[E]xercises' and the repetition of tasks characterise the disciplinary

model of [ ]power.
ALAN HUNT & GARY Wic-Aui, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TowARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GovERNANCE 49-50 (1994); see also Michel Foucault, The Suyect and Power, in MICHEL FOUCAULT:
BEYOND STRucruRAusi AND HRmENEurrIcs 208, 221 (Herbert Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow
eds., 1982) (suggesting that disciplinary power "structures the possible field of actions of
others").
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narrow sets of circumstances such as pregnancy and marriage. 1 32 Firing one black employee in favor of another because the latter performed his identity in a way that was more racially palatable appears to
pass muster.
The hard question is: Are there solutions to this problem? We
think so. The law does not offer much promise, though doctrinal
changes might provide some help. 133 More important, there are institutional changes employers can make to ameliorate the working identity phenomenon. Employers, especially in the high level jobs that we
describe, often bewail the lack of diversity in their institutions and
claim that they are willing to make extra efforts to solve the problems
of retaining and hiring "qualified" outsiders. To the extent that they
can be persuaded that outsiders bear extra costs in working identity
that are, in substantial part, a function of the existing institutional
structures and workplace norms, perhaps they can be persuaded to
modify those structures. In a paper further developing this theme, we
tackle precisely the questions of how the existing institutional structures might be altered to address the problems that this Article has
34
identified.'

132 As we have presented the ideas in this Article at a number of workshops, one question that we have been asked: "Isn't what you describe (the phenomenon of working identity) something that everyone does? Is the amount of identity work that outsiders do
meaningfully different from the work that insiders do?" The answer to the first question is,
of course, "Yes, this is a generalizable phenomenon. Everyone works identity." As to the
second question, our answer is typically that the amount of extra work is likely to be a
function of the type of stereotypes at play. That said, our sense is that the extra identity
work that outsiders do is substantial. In conveying that point, the following analogy may be
useful. That analogy is to the bitter complaints that are often made by insiders about the
burdens and constraining effects of sexual harassment laws and "PC-ness-that both overregulate and constrain their workplace interactions; both prevent them from being who
they are and saying what they would like. The burdens and constraints that women and
minorities face on a daily basis are akin to those, except magnified many times over. See
supra note 94 (citing articles detailing these costs).
133 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Title VIls Racial Subject, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
PROBS. (forthcoming 2001) (exploring the doctrinal implications of identity
performances).
134
As we have said, the discussion reflects a static conception of insider behavior. Insider behavior, of course, is not static. Just as outsider behavior can be a function of perceptions of discrimination, so can insider behavior. The question of the interactional
dynamic between insiders and outsiders also arises. In our paper following this Article, we
relax the assumption that insider behavior is static. In doing so, we suggest that creating
an explicit awareness on the part of insiders (and outsiders) can be a step towards creating
workplace environments in which the extra costs of working identity are significantly ameliorated. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21.

